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THE INTERSECTION OF LAW, POLICY, AND
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: AN
EXPLORATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES*
MICHAEL D. WHITE** & HENRY F. FRADELLA***
Police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) have diffused rapidly
among U.S. law enforcement, in part because of early studies
which suggested that the technology could produce important
outcomes for police and their communities. The potential for
BWCs to produce positive outcomes is affected by a wide range
of issues tied to program planning and implementation, as all of
the benefits of BWCs can be short-circuited by poor predeployment decisions. This Article seeks to inform the continued
diffusion of this technology through a deep examination of BWC
research and resources. The authors first review the body of
research on BWCs and describe best practices for planning and
implementing a BWC program. The authors also highlight the
importance of administrative policy through a critical review of
four controversial BWC policy issues: activation, citizen
notification, officer review of footage, and supervisory review of
footage. The policy discussion is grounded in reviews of the
relevant research and the results of an analysis of 129 BWC
policies. Last, the authors suggest the larger discretion control
framework in policing offers an important lens for guiding
officer BWC decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement interest in body-worn cameras can be traced
back more than a decade. A handful of law enforcement agencies in
the United Kingdom began experimenting with the technology as
early as 2005, 1 and several North American law enforcement
agencies—such as those in Rialto, California; Phoenix, Arizona; and
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada—piloted BWCs from 2009–2012.2
A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey in 2013 found that
approximately one-third of surveyed US law enforcement agencies
had already deployed BWCs to some of their officers.3 Though early
interest was grounded primarily in the perceived evidentiary value of
the cameras, many also recognized the accountability potential of
BWCs.4 For example, in August 2013 a federal judge included the
technology as a remedy in the ruling against the New York City
Police Department’s Stop, Question, Frisk (“SQF”) program.5
1. See MARTIN GOODALL, POLICE & CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE,
GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 6, 30 (2007),
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/guidance-body-worn-devices.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GQA6-9HD5].
2. See CHARLES M. KATZ, DAVID E. CHOATE, JUSTIN T. READ, & LIDIA NUÑO,
CTR. FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CMTY. SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–6 (2014),
https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8TX7-PUTZ]; MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DIAGNOSTIC CTR.,
POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 17–18 (2014),
https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p289-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSD-Y8ED].
3. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q4Z-JPWM].
4. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 7, 19–27.
5. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“To address
the violations that I have found, I shall order various remedies including, but not limited
to, . . . a trial program requiring the use of body-worn cameras in one precinct per
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The focus on BWCs skyrocketed after the summer of 2014
sparked, in large part, by a series of citizen deaths at the hands of the
police—especially those of Eric Garner,6 Michael Brown,7 and Tamir
Rice8—that generated public outrage and civil disorder in New York
City; Ferguson, Missouri; and Cleveland, Ohio, respectively,9 leading
to calls for police reform from civil rights organizations 10 and
grassroots movements like Black Lives Matter.11 In response to this
crisis, in late 2014 the White House created the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, and former President Obama
“charged the task force with identifying best practices and offering
borough.”). For more detailed information on this case and the SQF practices challenged
in it, see MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 89–105 (2016).
6. See Jericka Duncan, Eric Garner Case: Video of Chokehold’s Aftermath Raises
New Questions, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/second-tape-ofnypd-chokehold-raises-new-questions-in-eric-garner-case/ [https://perma.cc/RC7H-656Z];
J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer
in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-oferic-garner.html [https://perma.cc/Q8JY-JKJL (dark archive)].
7. See Jon Swaine, Michael Brown Protests in Ferguson Met with Rubber Bullets and
Teargas, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14
/ferguson-police-teargas-rubber-bullets-michael-brown
[https://perma.cc/6F82-HHTY].
For a detailed overview of Michael Brown’s killing and the aftermath of his death, see
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY
FERGUSON,
MISSOURI
POLICE
OFFICER
DARREN
WILSON
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj
_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2Q-GPBH].
8. See Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-YearPOST
(Nov.
26,
2014),
Old
Tamir
Rice
Within
Seconds,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-videonames-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/?utm_term=.3fb300e7e289
[https://perma.cc/7KQW-P35L].
9. See supra notes 6–8. Since 2014, the deaths of Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, Samuel
Dubose, and others have similarly caused great controversy in additional cities. See
Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved Deaths of
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/12/us
/looking-for-accountability-in-police-involved-deaths-of-blacks.html
[https://perma.cc
/WQS3-G9TU (dark archive)].
10. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, NAACP, ACLU, Other Groups
Call for Police Reform in Maryland, BALTIMORE SUN (July 23, 2015);
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-police-panel-20150723
-story.html [https://perma.cc/FN98-2CYV].
11. See, e.g., SUE BRADFORD EDWARDS & DUCHESS HARRIS, BLACK LIVES
MATTER 88–99 (Arnold Ringstad ed., 2016); CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE MAKING OF
BLACK LIVES MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN IDEA x–xii (2017); WESLEY LOWERY,
“THEY CAN’T KILL US ALL”: FERGUSON, BALTIMORE, AND A NEW ERA IN AMERICA’S
RACIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 221–36 (2017); KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM
#BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION 2–6 (2016).
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recommendations” to build community trust and enhance police
accountability.12 In May 2015, the Task Force released a final report
with more than sixty recommendations for change.13
BWCs have emerged as a mechanism that many believe can
alleviate the current crisis. Police BWCs were prominently featured in
the final report recommendations of the 2015 President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing.14 BWCs were also a central tenet of former
President Obama’s community policing plan.15 Moreover, since 2015
the United States Department of Justice (“US DOJ”) has awarded
nearly $60 million in grant funding to more than 250 law enforcement
agencies to deploy BWCs. 16 Some evidence suggests that use of
BWCs is supported across a diverse range of other key stakeholders
including police leadership organizations, 17 civil rights groups
(including the American Civil Liberties Union), 18 police officers
themselves,19 and citizens.20 Though there are no definitive counts of
12. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov
/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENS5-5LQL]. The President’s
Task Force scheduled public hearings throughout the US and heard testimony from
scholars, advocates, citizens, and police leaders. See id. at 5.
13. Id. at 85–98.
14. Id. at 31–32.
15. See David Hudson, Building Trust Between Communities and Local Police.
WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/01
/building-trust-between-communities-and-local-police [https://perma.cc/92N6-9ZBN].
16. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UPDATE: FISCAL
YEAR 2016 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/BWCPIP-Factsheet-2016-UpdateFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3ZB-VCMM]. In December 2014, President Obama pledged
$75 million to deploy 50,000 BWCs across the United States. Carrie Dann & Andrew
Rafferty, Obama Requests $263 Million for Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/obama-requests-263-millionpolice-body-cameras-training-n259161 [https://perma.cc/4YG8-DRLP].
17. See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BODY-WORN CAMERAS MODEL
POLICY 1–3 (2014), http://www.theiacp.org/model-policy/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017
/07/BodyWornCamerasPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PA7-H9K9].
18. See JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED
CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 2 (2015), https://www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/89MU-Y96N]
(“[BWCs] have the potential to be a win-win, helping protect the public against police
misconduct, and at the same time helping protect police against false accusations of
abuse.”).
19. See Janne E. Gaub, David E. Choate, Natalie Todak, Charles M. Katz & Michael
D. White, Officer Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras Before and After Deployment: A
Study of Three Departments, 19 POLICE Q. 275, 283 (2016) (finding that police officers in
all three surveyed police departments “believed that BWCs have evidentiary value”);
Wesley G. Jennings, Lorie Fridell & Mathew D. Lynch, Cops and Cameras: Officer
Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549,
549 (2014) (“[O]fficers generally reported considerably high rates of agreement to
questions such as they believe that their agency should adopt body-worn cameras for all of

96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018)

1584

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

the number of law enforcement agencies that have deployed BWCs
by 2017, some experts estimate that nearly all police departments will
adopt the technology within the next three to five years.21
The rapid diffusion of BWCs in law enforcement has also been
driven by findings from a handful of early research studies, which
suggested cameras can lead to substantial reductions in citizen
complaints and use of force by police.22 A 2013 evaluation of the
Rialto Police Department in California documented a nearly ninety
percent drop in citizen complaints against police and an over sixty
percent decline in use of force following deployment of BWCs.23
Other positive results emerged from studies of police departments in
Mesa, Arizona;24 Orlando, Florida;25 and Phoenix, Arizona.26 Several
other studies also found that BWCs can lead to enhanced court case
processing times and outcomes.27
their police officers, and that they would feel comfortable wearing body-worn cameras.”).
It should be noted, however, that even in these studies, only some police officers support
BWCs, and of those officers, their support is often qualified.
20. See Matthew S. Crow, Jamie A. Snyder, Vaughn J. Crichlow & John Ortiz
Smykla, Community Perceptions of Police Body-Worn Cameras: The Impact of Views on
Fairness, Fear, Performance, and Privacy, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 589, 590 (2017)
(“Anecdotal evidence and limited research suggest that the public supports BWCs, but the
factors driving public support remain unknown.”); William H. Sousa, Terance D. Miethe
& Mari Sakiyama, Inconsistencies in Public Opinion of Body-Worn Cameras on Police:
Transparency, Trust, and Improved Police-Citizen Relationships, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y &
PRAC. 100, 108 (2018) (analyzing public opinion of BWCs and concluding that “citizens
are supportive of BWCs in policing”).
21. Kriston Capps, Police Body Cameras: Coming Everywhere in 3 to 5 Years,
CITYLAB (July 30, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/07/police-body-camerascoming-everywhere-in-3-to-5-years/399992/ [https://perma.cc/5MHU-C5UZ].
22. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 20–23.
23. Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police BodyWorn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 523–24 (2015).
24. See RYAN STOKES & LEE RANKIN, MESA POLICE DEPARTMENT, PROGRAM
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM 8–9
(2013),
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/LEIM/Operational%20Track
%20Workshops/O2%20On%20Body%20Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CAC-CQCX].
25. See Wesley G. Jennings, Mathew D. Lynch & Lorie Fridell, Evaluating the Impact
of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious
External Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience
Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 485 (2015) (“Taken
together, the results from this methodologically rigorous, randomized experiment all point
toward the effectiveness of BWCs for improving police-community relations and reducing
a host of tragic events that can result from negative police-citizen encounters.”).
26. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 33 (finding a 22.5% decline in officially
recorded complaints).
27. See ODS CONSULTING, BODY WORN VIDEO PROJECTS IN PAISLEY AND
ABERDEEN 9 (2011), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV-ScottishReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFH-TK3M] (suggesting that BWCs increased the
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More recent research, however, demonstrates that positive
outcomes are not always guaranteed, and BWCs are not uniformly
desired. Several 2015 studies have documented no significant impact
on use of force and citizen complaints.28 Ariel and colleagues found a
troubling link between BWCs and increased rates of assaults on
officers.29 In August 2016, the Boston Police Patrolman’s Association
sought a court injunction to stop the department leadership from
creating a mandatory BWC program, claiming that it would “subject
unwilling officers to increased risks.” 30 More generally, critics of
BWCs point to a complex range of issues including: citizen privacy,
cost and resource commitment, training and policy requirements, and
operational concerns (e.g., failure to activate).31
The emerging picture suggests that the potential for BWCs to
produce positive outcomes may be affected by a wide range of issues
tied to program planning and implementation. 32 There is a long
likelihood of guilty pleas in Scotland); CATHERINE OWENS, DAVID MANN & RORY
MCKENNA,
THE
ESSEX
BODY
WORN
VIDEO
TRIAL
1–2
(2014),
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/BWV_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2PSU-547B] (finding that the presence of a BWC increased the likelihood that an
individual would be criminally charged).
28. See EDMONTON POLICE SERV., BODY WORN VIDEO: CONSIDERING THE
EVIDENCE 8 (2015), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/EdmontonPolice-BWV-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4FF-6EVZ] (finding “no quantitative
evidence” suggesting that BWCs impacted complaints or use of force); LYNNE
GROSSMITH, CATHERINE OWENS, WILL FINN, DAVID MANN, TOM DAVIES & LAURA
BAIKA, POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON’S CLUSTER RANDOMISED
CONTROLLED
TRIAL
OF
BODY
WORN
VIDEO
15,
17
(2015),
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Police_Camera_Evidence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C98Y-3ZCT] (finding BWCs had a small but positive impact on citizen
complaints, but no impact on use of force) .
29. Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and
Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13
EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744, 750 (2016).
30. Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Boston Police Patrolmen’s
Ass’n v. City of Boston, No. 16-2670-B (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016). In denying the
injunction request, the court noted that “[a]t best . . . the state of the research [on BWCs]
is inconclusive, particularly as to implementation of BWCs in Boston.” Id.
31. See Brian Bakst & Ryan J. Foley, For Police Body Cameras, Big Costs Loom in
Storage, POLICEONE (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/bodycameras/articles/8243271-For-police-body-cameras-big-costs-loom-in-storage/ [https://perma.cc
/6XF4-VMD4]; Andrew Gorosko, Police Acquisition of Body-Worn Cameras Delayed,
NEWTOWN BEE (Jan. 8, 2018), https://newtownbee.com/police-acquisition-of-body-worncameras-delayed/ [https://perma.cc/2JGD-R2BB]; Peter Hermann, Oversight Board Finds
Many D.C. Officers Fail to Properly Use Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/oversight-board-finds-many-dc-officersfail-to-properly-use-body-cameras/2017/10/31/5742ec38-bd81-11e7-8444-a0d4f04b89eb
_story.html?utm_term=.6e2861d42de3 [https://perma.cc/6BFA-UYLU (dark archive)].
32. Cf. Michael D. White, Janne E. Gaub & Natalie Todak, Exploring the Potential
for Body-Worn Cameras to Reduce Violence in Police-Citizen Encounters, 12 POLICING: J.
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history
of
implementation
failures
in
criminal
justice
programming33—sometimes with harmful consequences.34 Given the
speed at which law enforcement agencies are adopting BWCs, the
consequences of poor BWC program implementation are significant,
from resistance among line officers to low usage by downstream
criminal justice actors and backlash from citizens. Simply put, all of
the benefits of BWCs can quickly be eroded by poor planning,
implementation failures, and ill-advised decisions on operational
issues covered in policy.
This Article seeks to inform the continued diffusion of this
technology through a deep examination of BWC research and
resources. In Part I, the authors first review the body of empirical
research on BWCs and highlight variation in the planning for and
implementation of these cameras as a cause for the mixed findings
across studies. With that premise as a backdrop, the authors then
describe three critically important factors that will shape the success
of an agency’s BWC program. First, in Part II, the authors address
BWC planning and implementation. In May 2015, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (“BJA”) rolled out a national “Body-Worn
Camera Toolkit.”35 The BJA’s Toolkit is designed to provide a wide
range of information about BWCs, and it includes a “Law
Enforcement Implementation Checklist”36 to serve as a best-practices
guide for successful planning and implementation of a BWC
program.37 Adherence to the best-practices guide should optimize the
likelihood of successful BWC implementation.

POL’Y & PRAC. 66, 73 (2018) (observing that mixed results produced by BWC studies may
be partially attributable to the implementation of new policies).
33. See DANIEL P. MEARS, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: AN
EVALUATION APPROACH TO INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 131–
32 (2010); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING EVALUATION OF ANTICRIME
PROGRAMS 45 (Mark W. Lipsey, John L. Adams, Denise C. Gottfredson, John V. Pepper
& David L. Weisburd eds., 2005); Edward E. Rhine, Tina L. Mawhorr & Evalyn C. Parks,
Implementation: The Bane of Effective Correctional Programs, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 347, 349–50 (2006).
34. See Brandon C. Welsh & Michael Rocque, When Crime Prevention Harms: A
Review of Systematic Reviews, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 245, 261–62 (2014).
35. Body-Worn Camera Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE’S JUSTICE
TODAY
(May
2015),
https://www.bja.gov/JusticeToday/5_2015_newsletter.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3GR-U55E]; see Body-Worn Camera Toolkit, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/bwc/ [https://perma.cc/JM4Z-525L].
36. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs
/BWCImplementationChecklist.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVU-YA9L].
37. One of the authors, Michael D. White, was involved in the creation of the national
Body-Worn Camera Toolkit and Law Enforcement Implementation Checklist. He also
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Second, the authors place special emphasis on policy
development in Part III. The US DOJ has funded a Training and
Technical Assistance (“TTA”) team to support law enforcement
agencies receiving federal BWC funds.38 One of the core areas of
TTA support involves policy development. 39 The TTA team has
developed a BWC policy review “scorecard” (“BJA Scorecard”) that
rates the comprehensiveness of BWC policy across forty-one specific
issues, covering eleven general areas. 40 The US DOJ policy
development and review process offers a model for law enforcement
agencies to follow in order to optimize the potential for a successful
BWC program.
Third, a number of specific BWC policy issues are controversial
and complex, drawing on questions of both state and federal law.
Agency decisions on specific policy issues are of great importance to
the vitality of a BWC program. In Part IV, the authors investigate
four controversial BWC policy issues: (1) officer activation of the
BWC; (2) citizen notification of the BWC (by the officer); (3) officer
authority to review BWC footage; and (4) supervisor review of BWC
footage. For each, the authors describe the complex policy and legal
issues at play. The authors then describe national trends in agency
policy and practice for each issue based on an analysis of 129 BWC
policies from agencies funded through the US DOJ. Last, in Part V,
the authors place BWC use in a larger discretion control framework
and draw on a robust body of policing research to offer
recommendations on how to properly guide, manage, and control
officer BWC decision-making.
I. BODY-WORN CAMERA RESEARCH TO DATE
Advocates have made numerous claims regarding the benefits of
BWCs. One of the most prominent claims is that cameras can reduce
violence during police-citizen encounters, resulting in fewer citizen

serves as Co-Director of Training and Technical Assistance to BJA’s BWC funding
program (called the “Policy and Implementation Program”).
38. About Us, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE,
http://www.bwctta.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/YBB5-6LDF].
39. Training and Technical Assistance, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING & TECH.
ASSISTANCE, http://www.bwctta.com/training-and-technical-assistance [https://perma.cc
/6VRX-86UE].
40. Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING
& TECH. ASSISTANCE, http://www.bwctta.com/resources/bwc-resources/body-worncamera-policy-review-scorecard [https://perma.cc/6533-ZVR2].
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complaints against police and less use of force by officers.41 A number
of early studies suggested the technology could produce measurable
change with regard to these two important outcomes. For instance,
Ariel and colleagues reported dramatic year-to-year declines in
citizen complaints (88%) and use of force (58.3%) following
deployment of BWCs.42 Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell examined “prepost” rates of force and complaints among a group of forty-six
officers, reporting declines of more than 50% for use of force and
65% for citizen complaints following BWC deployment. 43 White,
Gaub, and Todak conducted a similar study in Spokane, Washington
and found similarly positive results, though the declines in complaints
and use of force disappeared after six months.44 They also found
BWCs had no effect on officer injuries. Studies in Mesa, Arizona;45
Tampa, Florida;46 and the United Kingdom47 have also documented
consistent reductions in these measures. Hedberg and colleagues
estimated the effect of BWCs on citizen complaints in Phoenix,
Arizona, and concluded, “if BWCs are employed as prescribed [i.e.,
100% activation compliance], a majority of complaints against officers
would be eliminated.”48

41. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 20–23 (citing to several BWC proponents who claim
that these cameras “will change police officer behavior during encounters with citizens”).
42. Ariel et al., supra note 23, at 524.
43. Jennings et al., supra note 25, at 480.
44. White et al., supra note 32, at 1, 5–6, 8 (“Following BWC deployment, the
percentage of officers with a complaint in each group declined by 50% and 78% (Control
and Treatment, respectively); the percentage of officers with a use of force declined
notably (39%) for one group only.”).
45. STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 8.
46. Dan Sullivan & Tony Marrero, USF Study Suggests Tampa Police with Body
Cameras Less Likely to Use Force, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/usf-study-suggests-tampa-police-with-bodycameras-less-likely-to-use-force/2290851 [https://perma.cc/G4AS-BFQB] (“The reduction
among the 60 officers who wore cameras amounts to about 20 fewer incidents of physical
force per year, according to the study. The authors speculate that if the cameras were
worn by the entire department, the same reduction would translate to about 250 fewer
incidents per year.”).
47. See GOODALL, supra note 1, at 7–8 (“In a number of cases the complainants have
reconsidered their complaint after this review, thus reducing investigation time for
unwarranted complaints.”); TOM ELLIS, CRAIG JENKINS & PAUL SMITH, EVALUATION
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL ISSUE BODY WORN VIDEO CAMERAS
(OPERATION
HYPERION)
ON
THE
ISLE
OF
WIGHT
2–3
(2015),
https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/2197790/Operation_Hyperion_Final_Report_to
_Hampshire_Constabulary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QBQ-AJ74] (finding that, after BWCs
were implemented, the number of low-level and high-level complaints decreased).
48. Eric C. Hedberg, Charles M. Katz & David E. Choate, Body-Worn Cameras and
Citizen Interactions with Police Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying
Compliance Levels, 34 JUST. Q. 627, 642 (2017).
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Several studies have also highlighted the evidentiary value of
BWCs. A Scottish study found that BWC cases were approximately
seventy to eighty percent “less likely to go to trial” than cases that did
not involve BWCs.49 Goodall reported that BWCs led to quicker
resolutions of cases, less officer time devoted to paperwork, and more
time spent on patrol.50 Morrow and colleagues concluded that BWCs
enhanced criminal justice outcomes for domestic violence cases in
Phoenix, Arizona,51 and a study in Essex, England, reported similar
findings.52
Research has also shown that some police officers are supportive
of BWCs, though the level of such support varies by department and
tends to increase after deployment.53 Studies have similarly shown
that citizen support for BWCs is high, among both the general
population54 and citizens who have had BWC-recorded encounters
with police.55 White, Todak, and Gaub found an intriguing connection
between citizen awareness of a BWC and increased perceptions of
procedural justice, thereby “providing a preliminary piece of evidence
that BWCs may be able to deliver on the claim the technology can
enhance police legitimacy.”56
However, several recent studies have failed to document positive
effects across a range of outcomes. A study by the Edmonton,
Alberta, Canada, Police Service concluded that BWCs had no
measurable impact on citizen complaints or use of force.57 Grossmith
and colleagues found a statistically significant decline in citizen
complaints in only two of the ten London police boroughs

49. ODS CONSULTING, supra note 27, at 10.
50. GOODALL, supra note 1, at 7.
51. Weston J. Morrow, Charles M. Katz & David E. Choate, Assessing the Impact of
Police Body-Worn Cameras on Arresting, Prosecuting, and Convicting Suspects of Intimate
Partner Violence, 19 POLICE Q. 303, 316–18 (2016) (finding that the evidentiary value of
BWCs aids in the prosecution and conviction of domestic violence offenders).
52. OWENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 15 (“The data suggest that the presence of the
camera increases the probability of an individual being charged (as opposed to other
forms of disposal), at all risk levels, but the effect is most noticeable for the lower risk
cases.”).
53. See Gaub et al., supra note 19, at 283–92; Jennings et al., supra note 19, at 552–54.
54. See Crow et al., supra note 20, at 599–600; Sousa et al., supra note 20, at 4–6.
55. Michael D. White, Natalie Todak & Janne E. Gaub, Assessing Citizen Perceptions
of Body-Worn Cameras After Encounters with Police, 40 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 689, 694–95 (2017) (surveying citizens who had BWC-recorded
encounters and finding that “more than 80 percent agreed/strongly agreed that the officer
acted professionally, and 72.9 percent indicated they believed the officer cared about their
well-being”).
56. Id. at 699.
57. EDMONTON POLICE SERV., supra note 28, at 8.
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examined.58 Ariel and colleagues reported mixed findings regarding
use of force across ten BWC studies, leading to an “overall null useof-force result.”59 The same study also found a troubling link between
BWCs and increased rates of assaults on officers.60 In a subsequent
article, Ariel and colleagues argued that the effects of BWCs are
determined by a delicate balance between officer discretion and
deterrence, and any imbalance between these issues can undermine
the benefits of BWCs.61
Several studies have also highlighted the importance of clear,
enforceable guidelines governing BWC use. The Mesa Police
Department reported BWC activations declined by 42% after the
adoption of a policy that vested officers with high levels of discretion
regarding when to activate their BWCs.62 Hedberg and colleagues
reported that Phoenix police officers failed to turn on their BWCs in
more than two-thirds of encounters where activation was required by
policy. 63 McClure and colleagues reported officer activation rates
from as low as 1.5% to as high as 65%, demonstrating how officers
within a single department can vary significantly in their levels of
compliance with BWC policy.64 Ariel and associates tied patterns in
use of force to officer decisions on BWC activation.65 That is, when
officers followed policy—i.e., when they activated the BWC at the
start of citizen encounters and advised citizens of the BWC—use of
force declined by nearly 40%.66 When officers did not follow policy,
use of force actually increased by more than 70%.67 Several studies
have also found that citizens are not always aware of the BWC’s

58. GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 28, at 15.
59. Ariel et al., supra note 29, at 750–52.
60. Id. at 750–53.
61. Barak Ariel, Alex Sutherland, Darren Henstock, Josh Young & Gabriela
Sosinski, The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn Cameras ‘Work’ or
‘Backfire’ in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 6, 6
(2018) (“[T]he deterrent effect of BWCs is a function of discretion, whereby strong
discretion is inversely linked to a weak deterrent effect that consequently leads to more
use of force, and weak discretion is inversely linked to a strong deterrent effect and less
forceful police responses.”).
62. See STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 13.
63. See Hedberg et al., supra note 48, at 640, 644–45.
64. DAVE MCCLURE, NANCY LA VIGNE, MATTHEW LYNCH, LAURA GOLIAN,
DANIEL LAWRENCE & AILI MALM, HOW BODY CAMERAS AFFECT COMMUNITY
MEMBERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE 7–9 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files
/publication/91331/2001307-how-body-cameras-affect-community-members-perceptions-of
-police_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEG2-9SYH].
65. See Ariel et al., supra note 61, at 9–12.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id.
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presence during the encounter, either because officers do not
announce the camera’s presence or because citizens are in a mental or
physical state (e.g., angry, intoxicated, mentally ill, in-crisis) that
inhibits their understanding of the officer’s BWC notification.68
Research testing the effect of BWCs on officer activity levels has
also been mixed. Two studies from the United Kingdom concluded
that BWCs had no significant impact on officer arrest activity.69 Katz
and colleagues reported increased arrests among BWC officers,70 but
Ready and Young found BWC officers conducted fewer stops and
made fewer arrests but issued more citations. 71 McClure and
colleagues also found BWC officers made slightly fewer arrests,
compared to non-BWC officers. 72 Moreover, officers (and their
unions) have protested the deployment of BWCs in a handful of
major police departments across the country––including Boston, Las
Vegas, and New York City––arguing that the technology endangers
officer safety or that it must be negotiated through collective
bargaining because of its major impact on officers’ working
conditions.73
The evidentiary value of BWCs can also be short-circuited by
both human and technological issues.74 First, if an officer forgets or
chooses not to activate a BWC, then no evidentiary benefit can be
seen from the camera’s use. Moreover, even if a camera is activated,
the value of this footage may be diminished or eliminated altogether
based on the camera angle if, for instance, the officer’s “shooting
platform” blocks the camera.75 Similarly, “[d]uring foot pursuits and
struggles with residents, the video from a BWC can become
68. See White et al., supra note 55, at 692, 696 (finding that when officers were not
required to inform citizens they were being recorded, only twenty-eight percent were
aware of BWCs); MCCLURE ET AL., supra note 64, at 4–5 (concluding that forty-three
percent of citizens who had interacted with officers could not remember whether the
officer was wearing a BWC).
69. GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 28, at 13; OWENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 1–2.
70. KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 31–32.
71. Justin T. Ready & Jacob T. N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras
on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 454 (2015).
72. MCCLURE ET AL., supra note 64, at 8 (“Officers assigned a BWC made about 0.35
fewer arrests every two weeks (14 days) than those not assigned a BWC.”).
73. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 28–29; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
74. See Michael D. White & James Coldren, Body-Worn Police Cameras: Separating
Fact from Fiction, PUB. MGMT. (PM) MAGAZINE, Mar. 2017, at 6, 7 (explaining how
“expectations must be realistic as BWCs have limitations, both human and
technological”).
75. Id. at 9. A “shooting platform” is described as “a shooting stance with
outstretched arms often will block a chest-mounted BWC.” Id.
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unwatchable . . . or the device can fall off the officer.”76 Accordingly,
the mobility of BWCs, while considered an advantage over dashboard
cameras, may ultimately prove to be more of a deficit than a benefit.77
II. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
The mixed findings across BWC studies may be explained, at
least in part, by variation in BWC program implementation.78 Proper
planning and implementation of a BWC program is a necessary
precondition for achieving positive outcomes. However, a BWC
program is a highly complex undertaking. BWCs require an
enormous investment of resources.79 The technology touches virtually
every aspect of internal and external police operations.80 BWCs also
bring into play a range of sensitive issues such as citizen privacy,
public records laws, and the recording of vulnerable populations.81
Additionally, BWCs are often adopted in contentious political and
social environments. 82 These difficulties are compounded by the
serious consequences of poor BWC program implementation,
including resistance among line officers and unions, low BWC
activation rates among officers, problems with technology integration
and data storage, unintended costs (financial and otherwise), little or
no usage by downstream criminal justice actors (i.e., prosecutors), and
backlash from citizens.83 In short, BWC implementation comes with
both a high degree of difficulty and significant risks if implemented
poorly.
Given the gravity of the issues at play, the US DOJ, through the
BJA, has developed resources to assist law enforcement agencies with
BWC implementation, including a “National Body-Worn Camera
Toolkit” (the “Toolkit”) and a “Law Enforcement Implementation
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See White et al., supra note 32, at 9 (noting that policy changes accompanying
BWC implementation may have influenced the study’s results).
79. WHITE, supra note 2, at 9. Aside from the “direct costs associated with purchasing
the hardware (from $800 to $1,000 per camera)[,]” BWC’s also “produce an enormous
amount of video data that must be properly and securely stored.” Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7.
82. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text; see also WHITE, supra note 2, at 19
(explaining how BWCs have traditionally been viewed as a way to promote transparency
and therefore “increase perceptions of police legitimacy”).
83. See generally NATALIE TODAK, JANNE E. GAUB & MICHAEL D. WHITE, WHAT
HAPPENS DOWNSTREAM? EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF BODY-WORN
CAMERAS (2017) (detailing external stakeholders’ perceptions of BWCs and how BWCs
impact their “daily work practices”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018)

2018]

LAW, POLICY & BODY CAMERAS

1593

Checklist” (the “Checklist”). 84 The Checklist outlines a series of
principles that should guide the development of a BWC program.85
These BWC principles are consistent with the larger evidence base on
successful program implementation in the criminal justice system,86
including policing, 87 courts, 88 and corrections. 89 Adherence to these
principles should lead to successful BWC implementation, which, in
turn, should optimize the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes.
In simple terms, the principles delineated in the Checklist provide a
roadmap for agencies to follow in order to avoid implementation
failure.
As explained in this Part, the Checklist identifies six core
principles intended to help guide the creation and implementation of
84. See Body Worn Camera Program, supra note 35; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, supra note 36.
85. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36.
86. See, e.g., AMANDA CISSNER & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., AVOIDING FAILURES OF
IMPLEMENTATION 5 (2009), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Failure
%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAR4-DXFF] (emphasizing the importance of a
formalized operational model); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, IMPLEMENTATION
OVERSIGHT FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMS 3–10 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~
/media/assets/2016/05/rf_programimplementationbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT6R-NVV9]
(recommending “four key steps to strengthen implementation of evidence-based
programs”); J. Mitchell Miller & Holly Ventura Miller, Rethinking Program Fidelity for
Criminal Justice, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 339, 343 (2015) (noting the US DOJ’s
focus on “developing and promoting evidence-driven organizational cultures”).
87. See, e.g., MELISSA REULAND, A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING POLICE-BASED
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 28–31 (2004),
http://www.pacenterofexcellence.pitt.edu/documents/A%20Guide%20to%20Implementin
g%20Police-Based%20Diversion%20Programs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3E6N-TCA2]
(explaining implementation challenges for mental health police-based response model);
SUSAN SADD & RANDOLPH M. GRINC, INNOVATIVE NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED
POLICING: DESCRIPTIONS OF PROGRAMS IN EIGHT CITIES 1 (1994),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/innovative-neighborhood
-oriented-policing-descriptions-of-programs-in-eight-cities/legacy_downloads/1268a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63F2-L423] (detailing results of eight community policing programs
aimed at reducing demand for drugs).
88. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION 14–22 (2010), https://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Pretrial
%20Services%20Starter%20Kit%20-%20PJI%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD7Y-3MP7]
(providing checklist and explaining steps for implementing “a fully functioning pretrial
services program”); Lisa S. Nored, Philip E. Carlan & Doug Goodman, Incentives and
Obstacles to Drug Court Implementation: Observations of Drug Court Judges and
Administrators, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring 2009, at 1, 18, http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj
/documents/incentives_and.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3KT-874R] (examining drug court
program implementation).
89. See, e.g., JANET RENO, RAYMOND C. FISHER, LAURIE ROBINSON & NANCY E.
GIST, CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF SUCCESSFUL CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS 27–33 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
/168966.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAV5-3MRH] (providing implementation guidelines for
successful, cost-effective correctional options).
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BWC programs: learn the fundamentals and develop a plan; form a
working group; develop policy; define the technology solution
(procurement strategy); communicate with and educate stakeholders;
and execute phased roll-out/implementation.90
A. Learn the Fundamentals and Develop a Plan
A BWC program should be carefully planned. 91 Agency
leadership should identify the outcomes it are seeking to achieve with
BWCs (transparency, accountability, etc.), as the specific goals may
significantly alter the BWC program’s structure. 92 Agency leaders
should have a clear understanding of the benefits and limitations of
BWCs, as well as what resources are required to operate a BWC
program.93 The Checklist recommends that agency leaders engage all
relevant stakeholders, internal and external, in the planning process.94
The Checklist also highlights the importance of selecting a project
manager and developing a project plan and timeline with
milestones.95
B.

Form a Working Group

The Checklist recommends creating a “Working Group,”
comprised of stakeholders, to guide the entire BWC planning
process.96 The Working Group should meet regularly to ensure that
the project timeline and budget are maintained.97 The Group should
include representatives from all units in the agency to gather insights,

90. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–3.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id.; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 86, at 4 (“The choice of which
programs to implement should be based on a clear vision of the desired outcomes and the
underlying causes of the problems, which can vary from one community to the next.”);
RENO, ET AL., supra note 89, at 9 (“[I]t is . . . important to consider the values and goals of
the criminal justice system in which the option is being planned.”).
93. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 42
(2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/BWC_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GM-ENA2]
[hereinafter BJA FAQs].
94. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; see also CISSNER &
FAROLE, supra note 86, at 5–6 (suggesting that criminal justice programs “[b]e strategic
about when and how to engage stakeholders in the planning process”).
95. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1.
96. Id. at 1–2; see also RENO, ET AL., supra note 89, at 6 (suggesting the formation of a
“working group to carry out the daily tasks involved in planning the program”).
97. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2; see also CISSNER &
FAROLE, supra note 86, at 7 (noting that timeline adjustments may be necessary if the
group begins falling behind schedule).
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questions, and concerns from all relevant parties.98 Comprehensive
participation will help overcome internal resistance and troubleshoot
problems as they arise. The Working Group should also engage with
external stakeholders, especially the city and county prosecutor, city
leadership, advocacy groups, and citizens.99
C.

Develop Policy

A comprehensive administrative policy is critically important for
a successful BWC program.100 The Working Group should review
relevant local, state, and federal law. 101 The Group should also
examine other agency policies, as well as model policies from the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) and the
United Kingdom Home Office.102 Policy development should be an
inclusive process, and the policy should be flexible as changes may be
required based on feedback from stakeholders. 103 The Checklist
highlights six core areas for which BWC policy should be defined:
video capture (activation, consent); video viewing (supervisor,
officer); video use (evidence); video public release; video storage, and
process/data audits and controls.104 The authors further explore the
comprehensiveness of BWC policy in Part IV.
D. Define the Technology Solution (Procurement)
Most jurisdictions have developed a formal procurement process
to guide the purchase of equipment such as BWCs. 105 The
procurement process becomes a central task for the Working
Group. 106 This process starts with an assessment of current
capabilities, including: the hardware and software needs or limitations

98. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2; BJA FAQs, supra
note 93, at 6, 32.
99. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2.
100. See id. at 2; BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 26.
101. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2; BJA FAQs, supra note
93, at 39.
102. BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 26.
103. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2.
104. Id.
105. See BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 17. For a discussion of procurement issues
related to BWCs, see Heather R. Cotter, Contemporary Issues in Policing: Why Police
Need to Strategically Plan for Technology Procurement, POLICEONE.COM (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/243486006-Why-policeneed-to-strategically-plan-for-technology-procurement/ [https://perma.cc/JW96-CEC6].
106. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2–3; BJA FAQs, supra
note 93, at 17.
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(such as camera resolution); financial constraints; and data storage.107
These issues are typically delineated in a Request for Proposals
(“RFP”) that is released to BWC vendors. 108 Bids submitted by
vendors are then reviewed, scored, and discussed among the Working
Group until there is consensus on vendor selection.109
E.

Educate Stakeholders

The Checklist recommends a strong communication plan to
publicize the BWC program among a diverse array of stakeholders.110
An internally-focused marketing campaign can facilitate BWC
deployment by addressing officers’ concerns.111 A similar campaign
targeted towards external stakeholders can address questions among
citizens, advocacy groups, and other criminal justice actors.112 In some
cases, the media can be used to publicize and engage the public in the
BWC program.113 The marketing campaign, while best determined by
local agencies,114 could focus on the program goals, the administrative
policy, the timeline for deployment, and the vendor selection process.
F.

Execute Phased Roll-Out/Implementation

The Checklist highlights several key developments in the last
step, including the training of officers and continued messaging both
internally and externally.115 The Checklist also recommends a phasedin deployment rather than agency-wide rollout because the staggered
approach is more measured and allows for flexibility should
adjustments be needed. 116 The Checklist highlights postimplementation assessments of BWC operations and outcomes, as
well as “periodic reviews of policy and training.”117
III. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW
The Checklist is grounded in a robust body of research that, over
a period of forty years, has consistently highlighted administrative
107. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2–3.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.; BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 31–32.
113. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; BJA FAQs, supra note 93,
at 32, 40.
114. BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 32.
115. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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rulemaking (i.e., policy) as the most effective method for guiding
police officer behavior. 118 Administrative policy communicates to
officers what the department considers acceptable, as well as what is
prohibited. 119 Police officer behavior can therefore be directly
influenced by administrative policy that is clear and widely
enforced. 120 Several organizations, including the IACP, the
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies
(“CALEA”), and the American Bar Association, have maintained
the importance of thoughtful, written directives as an effective
manner in which to guide police discretion.121
The discretion-control value of administrative policy on a wide
range of officer street behaviors has been reinforced consistently by
results of empirical research. For example, some research shows that
the enforcement of restrictive administrative policies can lead to
lower levels of deadly force.122 Permissive or unenforced policies, in
contrast, have been linked to higher rates of officer-involved
shootings. 123 These results led historian and criminologist Samuel
Walker to conclude that “administrative rules have successfully
limited police shooting discretion, with positive results in terms of

118. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION 388–97 (9th ed. 2018); Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by
Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 500–02 (1971).
119. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 132 (citing VICTOR E. KAPPELER,
RICHARD D. SLUDER & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, FORCES OF DEVIANCE:
UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING 218 (1998)).
120. Id.
121. See id.; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: URBAN POLICE FUNCTION § 1-4.3
(AM. BAR ASS’N, 2d ed. 1980) (explaining that administrative rulemaking is essential to
the uniform control of police discretion); W. DWAYNE ORRICK, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS
OF POLICE, DEVELOPING A POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY-PROCEDURE MANUAL 2,
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BP-PolicyProcedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFP9HHFX] (explaining that a police department policy-procedure manual must include
“[w]ritten directives related to policy, procedures, rules and regulations”); The
Commission, CALEA (2010), http://www.calea.org/content/commission [https://perma.cc
/34FF-P8AB] (explaining that CALEA accreditation “require[s] an agency to develop a
comprehensive, well thought out, uniform set of written directives” because it represents
“one of the most successful methods for reaching administrative and operational goals,
while also providing direction to personnel”).
122. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 132 (citing James J. Fyfe, Police Use of
Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 199–201 (1988)); see also WILLIAM A.
GELLER & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW 257 (1992)
(explaining how empirical researchers have concluded that “departments with restrictive
shooting policies experienced lower levels of shooting mb officers than departments with
more permissive policies”).
123. GELLER & SCOTT, supra note 122, at 257; Michael D. White, Controlling Police
Decisions to Use Deadly Force: Reexamining the Importance of Administrative Policy, 47
CRIME & DELINQ. 131, 145 (2001).
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social policy. Fewer people are being shot and killed, racial disparities
in shootings have been reduced, and police officers are in no greater
danger because of these restrictions.”124 Researchers have reported
similar effects across other areas of policing, “including high-speed
pursuits, use of police dogs, foot pursuits, and responses to domestic
violence incidents.”125
Given the relative novelty of police BWCs, there is scant
empirical research documenting the effect of BWC policy on officers’
use of the technology.126 As a result, the US DOJ, through the BJA,
has developed a BWC administrative policy review process to provide
guidance to law enforcement agencies in this critically important
area.127 The policy review process, developed by the national TTA
team, is grounded in the robust body of evidence documenting the
effectiveness of administrative policy in other aspects of police field
behavior (e.g., use of force, auto pursuits), as well as the best
available evidence on police BWCs.128 The BJT Scorecard forms the
centerpiece of the policy review process. Evaluators use the BJA
Scorecard to rate the overall comprehensive of a proposed BWC
policy across eleven general policy areas, encompassing forty-one
specific dimensions.129 The eleven policy areas are summarized in
Table 1.

124. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 32 (1992).
125. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 134 (citing SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A.
ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 84 (2d ed. 2014));
MICHAEL D. WHITE, CURRENT ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES IN POLICING 276–78
(2007); see also GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, POLICE PURSUIT: POLICIES AND TRAINING 4
(1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164831.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN2P-KYVV] (noting
how more restrictive police pursuit policies drastically decreased the number of pursuits);
MERRICK J. BOBB & STAFF, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT: 12TH
SEMIANNUAL REPORT 40–42 (2000), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PNCA-0001-0012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM3F-ZAM6] (noting that strict enforcement of
canine policies led to fewer dog bites).
126. For an exception, see STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 7.
127. See Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, supra note 40.
128. See id.; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN
CAMERA PROGRAM 37, 48–49 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free
_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera
%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Q7-KEP6]; WHITE, supra note 2, at 8–10.
129. Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, supra note 40.
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Policy Development
General Issues
Video Capture – Activation
Video Capture – Deactivation
Data Transfer/Download
Data Storage/Retention
BWC Viewing
BWC Training
Public Release
Policy and Program Evaluation
BWCs and Use of Force

Table 1: Policy Areas on The BJA Scorecard for BWCs
Each of the forty-one items embedded in the eleven areas listed
in Table 1 is scored as a “0” or a “1” on the BJA Scorecard, based on
whether the issue is addressed in the policy; thus, a score of forty-one
out of forty-one points represents a perfect score. Seventeen items on
the BJA Scorecard are in red text, indicating that they are of critical
importance and should be mandatory in a BWC policy.130 The BJA
Scorecard therefore allows an agency to examine its policy
performance in each of the eleven areas via subtotal scores, as well as
its overall performance.
Law enforcement agencies that receive federal funding through
BJA’s Body-Worn Camera Policy and Implementation Program
130. Id.
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(“PIP”) go through a mandatory policy review process at the start of
their grant period.131 The agency can access ten percent of their grant
funds immediately upon notification of the award, but the agency
cannot access the remaining ninety percent until it passes the policy
review process.132 Staff from the grantee agency work with TTA team
members to score the policy on the BWC policy scorecard. This is
typically an iterative, collaborative process that can take several
weeks or even months. To pass the policy review process and access
the remainder of their grant funds, the agency must score at least an
eighty percent overall on the BJA Scorecard (thirty-three or higher
out of forty-one possible points), as well as a perfect sub-score of
seventeen out of seventeen points for the mandatory items.133
It is important to note that the BJA Scorecard rates
comprehensiveness only. Put differently, the BJA Scorecard assesses
whether an issue is addressed in policy or not. The BJA Scorecard is
not prescriptive or directional in terms of actual policy language. For
example, one controversial issue addressed in Part IV is citizen
notification: should officers advise citizens that they are being
recorded on a BWC? 134 The BJA Scorecard item on citizen
notification states, “Does the policy provide guidance on citizen
notification of BWC?” If the policy provides guidance, the item is
scored a “1” regardless of the exact nature of that guidance. The
policy could mandate that officers notify citizens of the BWC (e.g.,
officers shall notify). The policy could recommend (but not require)
that officers notify citizens of the BWC, or it could simply advise
officers they are not required to notify citizens of the BWC. All three
of these very different policy positions would receive a score of “1”
for the citizen notification item. The US DOJ and the TTA team
believe that specific decisions on key policy issues should be made at
the local level between the law enforcement agency and all relevant
stakeholders, rather than be prescribed by the federal government.
The BJA Scorecard is publicly available as a tool to assist
agencies in developing comprehensive BWC policies. Moreover,
131. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BODY-WORN
CAMERA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FY 2017 COMPETITIVE GRANT
ANNOUNCEMENT
10–11
(2016),
https://www.bja.gov/funding/BWCPIP17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74BF-XME5].
132. Id. at 6.
133. MICHAEL D. WHITE, JESSICA HERBERT & CHARLES M. KATZ, KEY TRENDS IN
BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2016), http://bwctta.com/sites/default
/files/Files/Resources/BWC%20Policy%20Analysis%20Final%2011-16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CTV6-DM52].
134. See infra Section IV.B.
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agencies looking for guidance on specific policy issues can draw on
the dozens of agency policies available on the Toolkit,135 as well as
model policies from police leadership organizations136 and advocacy
groups.137
IV. DIFFICULT POLICY POSITIONS
Although the BJA Scorecard provides a model for developing a
comprehensive BWC policy, local decisions on specific policy issues
can be quite complicated, and, if poorly thought out, can short circuit
the benefits of the technology. Many legal, operational, and policy
concerns relevant to BWCs have been raised by scholars,
practitioners, and commentators in a variety of forums, including
peer-reviewed journal articles, 138 research reports, 139 law review
articles,140 articles and editorials in newspapers141 and magazines,142

135. See Policy, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT,
https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-policy.html [https://perma.cc/R7NP-EMBE].
136. E.g., INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 17, at 1–2; POLICE EXEC.
RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 53–66.
137. E.g., A Model Act for Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearablebody-cameras-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/9C7G-R5AJ].
138. See, e.g., Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”: A Global Multisite
Randomized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizens’
Complaints Against the Police, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 293, 295 (2017) (noting how
non-camera officers’ decision-making may be affected the presence of cameras on their
co-workers); Ariel et al., supra note 29, at 750 (explaining that cameras may affect officer
reporting of assaults against them); Ready & Young, supra note 71 (describing how officer
discretion may be affected differentially, in that some forms of activity may increase (selfinitiated) while others decrease (arrests)).
139. See, e.g., KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 40–41; CYNTHIA LUM, CHRISTOPHER
KOPER, LINDA MEROLA, AMBER SCHERER & AMANDA REIOUX, EXISTING AND
ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES
19–20 (2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Phase-I-Report-Nov28-2015-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Y8-F9QM]; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
supra note 128, at 1–3; STANLEY, supra note 18, at 2; WHITE, supra note 2, at 27–34.
140. See, e.g., Developments in the Law––Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1800–17
(2015); Richard Lin, Note, Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits
While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 346, 349–57 (2016).
141. See, e.g., Mark Bowes, Police Body Camera Video Strains Chesterfield County
Prosecutor, ROANOKE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.roanoke.com/news/virginia
/police-body-camera-video-strains-chesterfield-county-prosecutor/article_acee6e5c-738b54f6-a9f3-6f6d6ec29be3.html [https://perma.cc/ZT42-NPMV]; Chris Dunn & Donna
Lieberman, Body Cameras Are Key for Police Accountability: We Can’t Let Them Erode
Privacy Rights, WASH. POST. (June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2017/06/01/bodycams-are-key-for-police-accountability-we-cant-let-them
-erode-privacy-rights/?utm_term=.80527c3d43d4 [https://perma.cc/FR8Z-D78W (dark
archive)]; Mitch Smith, Minneapolis Police Change Body Camera Policy After Fatal
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/minneapolis-
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blogs,143 and even podcasts.144 This Article does not rehash all of these
debates. Rather, it highlights four overarching questions that have
generated significant controversy among practitioners, researchers,
and advocacy groups, each of which subsumes several distinct, but
related, issues: (1) when should officers record their interactions with
the public (i.e., activation)?; (2) what are the implications of an
officer’s decision to notify, or his failure to notify, the citizen of the
BWC?; (3) what might be the intended and unintended effects of
officer review of BWC footage, especially after a critical incident,
such as an officer-involved shooting?; and (4) when should
supervisors review the BWC footage of their subordinate officers?
A. Policy Issue 1: When Should Officers Record Their Interactions
with the Public?
In many U.S. jurisdictions, law enforcement officials need to be
careful about running afoul of laws governing the recording of
communications and other laws intended to safeguard citizens’
privacy. As part of the examination of these issues, we begin by
summarizing fundamental concepts of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. We then examine specific statutory and constitutional
principles that might apply to police use of BWCs.
1. Primer on Privacy
a.

The Property Rights Approach

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people “to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

police-body-camera-policy-fatal-shooting.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/YF2V-TYNJ
(dark archive)].
142. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Seen It All Before: 10 Predictions About Police Body
Cameras, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2014); https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014
/12/seen-it-all-before-10-predictions-about-police-body-cameras/383456/ [https://perma.cc
/5ZWM-57J6]; Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body Cameras, TIME (May 4,
2015), http://time.com/3843157/the-problem-with-police-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc
/7LT9-3ZHJ].
143. See, e.g., John V. Berry, Legal Issues for Police Officers with Body-Worn Cameras,
POLICE L. BLOG (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.policelawblog.com/blog/body-worn-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/YP6H-8PKE]; Alex Sutherland & Barak Ariel, How Police Body
Cameras Can Improve Behavior, Ease Tension, RAND BLOG (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/11/how-police-body-cameras-can-improve-behavior-easetension.html [https://perma.cc/3D2G-XFTA].
144. The BJA now has its own “BWC Podcast Series,” which can be downloaded
online. See BWC Podcast Series, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov
/Publications/podcasts/podcast.html [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-PQF].
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unreasonable searches and seizures.”145 Because the express language
of the Fourth Amendment stresses the importance of both personal
and real property rights,146 “it is unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme
Court initially grounded Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a
property-rights framework.” 147 As Olmstead v. United States 148
illustrates, this approach relies on the premise that a “search,” for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when governmental
actors physically trespass upon a constitutionally protected area.149
Yet what the Court considers to be a physical intrusion is not
always intuitive. For example, in Olmstead, the evidence used to
convict the defendants of conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act was obtained through wiretaps of the defendants’
home telephones and their principle place of business.150 The Court
ruled that neither a search nor a seizure had occurred under the
Fourth Amendment because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants”––i.e., because the wiretaps were installed
without physically trespassing on the defendants’ property. 151
Similarly, in Goldman v. United States,152 the Court again relied on
the lack of physical intrusion, finding that the placement of a listening
device against a wall adjoining the defendant’s office did not
constitute an illegal search or seizure.153
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that
“[w]hen the Government physically invades personal property to
gather information, a search occurs.”154 For example, in Florida v.
Jardines,155 the Court concluded that an unlawful search had occurred
when police walked their drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s
porch without a warrant, emphasizing that “the detectives had all
four of their feet and all four of their companion's firmly planted on
the constitutionally protected extension of [the defendant’s]

145. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146. See id. See generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA
CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001) (discussing the importance of
historical views on modern property rights).
147. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy
Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19,
23 (2016).
148. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
149. Id. at 466.
150. Id. at 456–57.
151. Id. at 464.
152. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
153. Id. at 135–36.
154. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (emphasis added).
155. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
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home.”156 The Court came to a similar result in Silverman v. United
States.157 There, the unconstitutional physical intrusion occurred when
law enforcement officers pushed a “spike mike” through a common
wall until it hit a heating duct in the defendant’s home.158 Even
though the invasion was minimal, the Court found that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated based on the fact that the microphone
physically invaded the defendant’s premises.159
b.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Approach

In Katz v. United States,160 the Supreme Court expanded Fourth
Amendment protections to encompass situations in which
governmental agents infringe upon someone’s reasonable expectation
of privacy even when there is no physical trespass to property.161 Katz
involved a challenge to the FBI’s warrantless electronic surveillance
of the defendant in a public telephone booth as a part of an
investigation into illegal gambling. 162 In agreeing that the FBI’s
activities “constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,” the Court was careful to emphasize that the
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.”163 Thus, “[t]he fact
that the electronic device . . . did not happen to penetrate the wall of
the booth can have no constitutional significance”—even though the
recording device was used in a public place, its use “violated the
privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied” while in the
phone booth.”164 Accordingly, the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test, articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence and now
considered to form the basis of the Court’s subsequent approach to
Fourth Amendment searches, states, “there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”165
Since Katz, courts have consistently relied on Justice Harlan’s
two-step test when analyzing Fourth Amendment search and seizure

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
25.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 8.
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 509–11.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 147, at
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion).
Id. at 351, 353.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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claims, 166 “despite the difficulty inherent in ascertaining when a
subjective expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable.’”167 And while the
Court has not completely abandoned the Olmstead property-based
approach, it has nonetheless made clear that the Katz approach
should apply in all cases not involving physical trespass.168
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy approach to the Fourth
Amendment has particular relevance to law enforcement use of
recording devices. For example, in United States v. Paxton,169 the
Seventh Circuit considered whether arrestees harbored a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to conversations held while they
were detained in a police van. 170 In finding that no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy existed, the court emphasized that
“[p]olice surveillance equipment (including both dashboard cameras
and body cameras) has become both cheaper and more effective” and
thus, “one wonders how much of a reminder a detainee needs that he
might be under surveillance—particularly in a marked police
vehicle.”171
2. Consent to Record
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, federal and state
statutory laws affect any person’s ability to record telephone and inperson conversations. Because BWCs involve the latter, it is
imperative that all BWC policies comply with statutes governing the
recording of conversations.
To deter improper surveillance by a third party, both federal law
and state-level provisions in forty-nine states require that at least one
166. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–41 (1979) (explaining Katz by
referring to Justice Harlan’s two step approach).
167. Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 147, at 25.
168. See id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)). For example, in United
States v. Lambus, 251 F. Supp. 3d 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), the court granted a motion to
suppress GPS tracking data, reasoning,
A tracking device search does not end at the moment of physical trespass by
installation. Whether conceptualized as one continuous search, or two
discrete searches . . . , the use of the tracking device to actually monitor the
location of a person or object is a separate search from installation for
Fourth Amendment purposes . . . . Even if the initial search occasioned by
the installation of the device is governed by a limited trespass doctrine, the
search occasioned by the use of the device to transmit precise location
information is controlled by the broader Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test.
Id. at 495.
169. 848 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2017).
170. Id. at 806.
171. Id. at 812–13.
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party to a conversation consent to any recording of that
conversation.172 For example, in the year following the decision in
Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.173 A major effect of this legislation, provided in Title III,
was to supersede prior prohibitions on electronic surveillance with a
new, limited authorization to use these techniques subject to a
warrant requirement. 174 Sometimes referred to as the federal
wiretapping laws, Title III generally prohibits the surreptitious
interception (recording) of “any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.” 175 Title III, its state law counterparts, and the
privacy guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are generally aimed at
curtailing governmental intrusions—especially those concerning
criminal investigations. 176 But these laws are also concerned with
protecting people’s privacy—even from eavesdropping under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the conversation.177 Under such
circumstances, at least one party to a conversation must generally
consent to it being recorded.178

172. See Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone
Conversations, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (2010).
173. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2012)).
174. JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 181–82 (12th ed.
2016). The Act has been amended numerous times, including, inter alia, by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C. (2012)); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); USA PATRIOT Act Additional
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–178, 120 Stat. 278 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261 (2008), 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)); FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112–3, 125 Stat. 5; and PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112–
14, 125 Stat. 216.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012); see also §§ 2510–2522.
176. See FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 174–202 (detailing the “series of judicially
created and statutory rules governing high-tech searches and surveillance”).
177. See Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the
Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 906 (1998); Michael J. Gibson,
Comment, Just Because It’s Legal Doesn’t Mean You Can Do It: The Legality of Employee
Eavesdropping and Illinois Workplace Recording Policies, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 913, 917–
19 (2015).
178. Bast, supra note 172, at 150–51.
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a. Eavesdropping When There Is No Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
As a general rule, when a conversation occurs in a public place
where third parties can overhear it, there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy as a matter of law.179 Consider, for example, that the Fifth
Circuit in Kee v. City of Rowlett180 upheld the use of recordings of
conversations and prayers made at a graveside burial service because
the public nature of the outdoor conversations rendered them beyond
the scope of any reasonable expectation of privacy.181 Courts have
similarly upheld the use of non-privileged recordings made in
correctional facilities182 and inside police vehicles on the basis that the
participants in the conversation lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the circumstances.183 And because, under federal law,
telephones themselves are not considered intercepting devices when
they are used at home or in offices as part of the ordinary course of
business,184 what family members overhear while eavesdropping on
the conversations of other family members using an extension
telephone185 and what employers overhear while monitoring phone
conversations over extensions for legitimate business reasons also do
not implicate Title III.186
b.

One-Party Consent

Under the so-called “one-party consent” approach, so long as
one person involved in a conversation is aware of the fact that the
179. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[C]onversations in the
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances would be unreasonable.”); see also FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at
191.
180. 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001).
181. Id. at 215–18.
182. See United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1169–70 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It is
unnecessary to consult the case law to conclude that one who expects privacy under the
circumstances of prison visiting is, if not actually foolish, exceptionally naïve.”); see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539g(d) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2018, No. 10 of the 2018
Reg. Sess., 99th Leg.).
183. See United States v. Paxton, 848 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2000); United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527–28 (11th Cir. 1993).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2012).
185. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 191 (citing Commonwealth v. Vieux, 671
N.E.2d 989 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)).
186. Id. (citing O’Sullivan v. NYNEX Corp., 687 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1997)).
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conversation is being recorded, then his or her consent to such
recording satisfies the requirement of both Title III as well as its state
law counterparts in roughly four-fifths of states.187
Thus, a law enforcement officer or a private citizen who is a
party to a communication may intercept the communication or
permit a law enforcement official to intercept the
communication without violating Title III or the Fourth
Amendment. This [one-party consent doctrine] allows a law
enforcement officer or agent, an informant, an accomplice or
co-conspirator, or a victim to wear a body microphone; act as an
undercover agent without being wired; or eavesdrop or record a
telephone conversation with the permission of the person
receiving the call even though the person making the call has no
knowledge of this activity. A private citizen, however, may not
intercept a communication “for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States or of any State.”188
c.

All-Party Consent

As of March 2018, fifteen states provide more privacy
protections than Title III, and the one-party consent approach is used
in the remaining U.S. jurisdictions. The laws in these states generally
fall into one of two categories: complete all-party consent or partial
all-party consent.
First, there are eleven states that provide a high level of privacy
for their residents with regard to the recording of communications by
private persons. These states include California, 189 Delaware, 190
Florida, 191 Georgia, 192 Illinois, 193 Maryland, 194 Massachusetts, 195
187. Id.; Gibson, supra note 177, at 917–19.
188. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 191–92 (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(d)).
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
190. DEL. CODE ANN. § 1335(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West, Westlaw current through 2017 First Reg.
Sess. & Special “A” Sess. of the 25th Legislature). State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla.
1985), carved out a narrow exception to Florida’s all-party consent law in a case in which
the victim of a murder had illegally recorded conversations with his murderer. Id. at 1274.
Although the concurrence argued that the statutory language at issue made it clear that
the audio recording should have been suppressed from evidence, id. at 1277 (Erlich, J.,
concurring) (“It is this Court’s tortuous misconstruction of the plain language of the
statute which requires the indefensible rationale of the majority opinion.”), the Supreme
Court of Florida took a seemingly results-oriented approach when it concluded that the
eavesdropping law did not apply in the case. The majority reasoned that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with the deceased victim
regarding a business deal in light of “the quasi-public nature of the premises within which
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Montana, 196 New Hampshire, 197 Pennsylvania, 198 and Washington. 199
Whenever there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, these states
prohibit the recording of most conversations between private
the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to
bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to
record the conversations.” Id. at 1274. Inciarrano has been followed in cases that mirror
the unusual facts of the case, such as when a recording is made in a place of business using
recording equipment that is visible. E.g., State v. Caraballo, 198 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2016) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when “conversion occurred
at a [public] sales counter . . . and the business was open to the public at the time the
recording was made”). Otherwise, Florida cases have generally limited Inciarrano by
distinguishing its somewhat unique circumstances from other recordings made by victims
of crime. E.g., McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 298 (Fla. 2014) (“Because of the
differences in the location, visibility of the recording device, and content of the recordings
at issue in Inciarrano, it presented a set of circumstances that are starkly different from
those present here.”); Abdo v. State, 144 So. 3d 594, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding
insufficient evidence that the defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in
moving car when it remained unclear “how many people were in the vehicle, whether [the
defendant] was aware of the recording, who recorded the video, and what was said on the
recording”).
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
193. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/14-2(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576 of
2018 Reg. Sess.). People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1986), reversed an
eavesdropping conviction of a defendant who, while in custody in the back seat of a police
vehicle, recorded the conversation of the two officers sitting in the front seat. Id. at 350.
Importantly, the officers knew the defendant had a tape recorder and allowed him to
maintain possession of it while in the patrol car. Id. Because the officers knew their
conversation was not private, the defendant’s recording of that conversation was held not
to violate the eavesdropping statute. Id. After the Beardsley decision, the Illinois
legislature felt it necessary to clarify, via statutory amendment, “that no recording could
be made absent consent from all parties regardless of any lack of expectation of privacy.
Thus, the statute now essentially deems all conversations to be private and not subject to
recording even if the participants themselves have no expectation of privacy.” People v.
Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154, 160 (Ill. 2014) (emphasis added).
194. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess.).
195. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch.
175 of 2017 1st Ann. Sess.).
196. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
197. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(I)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
198. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704(4) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
199. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 3d Spec.
Sess.). Washington prohibits the interception or recording of “private conversation[s].” Id.
To determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that triggers this
eavesdropping law, courts are to consider the “(1) duration and subject matter of the
conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or potential presence of a third
party, and (3) role of the non-consenting party and his or her relationship to the
consenting party.” Lewis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Wash. 2006). The
court in Lewis held that “traffic stop conversations are not private[;]” yet, the Washington
statute nonetheless requires law enforcement officers to notify drivers that they are being
recorded during a traffic stop. Id. at 1086.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018)

1610

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

persons—including in-person, by telephone, or via any electronic or
computer-based communication system—without the permission of
all the parties. Massachusetts courts have gone even further than most
states by requiring consent from all parties to record in-person
conversations that occur in public locations.200
Second, another four states require all-party consent for some
types of communications, but only one-party consent for others.
Connecticut, for example, applies all-party consent to telephone
conversations,201 but one-party consent to the recording of in-person
communications. 202 Similarly, unless there is some emergency
situation that is later ratified by a court, Nevada typically requires allparty consent to record telephone conversations,203 but only requires
one-party consent to record in-person conversations.204 Conversely,
Oregon utilizes the one-party consent for telephone and other forms
of wire communications, but requires all-party consent to record an
in-person conversation.205
Unlike Connecticut, Nevada, and Oregon, Michigan does not
differentiate between in-person, telephone, and electronic
communications. Rather, its rules vary depending on who is doing the
recording. At first blush, Michigan appears to be an all-party consent
state because its eavesdropping law applies to the recording of “any
part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all”
parties to the conversation.206 Michigan law also provides that “[a]ny
person who is present or who is not present during a private
conversation and who willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the
conversation without the consent of all parties thereto” is guilty of a
felony. 207 A 1982 decision from the Michigan Court of Appeals,
200. Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(upholding conviction of a protestor for secretly audio-taping a conversation with police
officer that occurred in public at a political rally).
201. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570d(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 June Special
Sess.).
202. Id. §§ 53a-187, -189 (Westlaw).
203. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.620 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); see
also Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940–41 (Nev. 1998) (finding that § 200.620
requires all-party consent to record private telephone conversations). But see State v.
Reyes, 808 P.2d 544, 547–48 (Nev. 1991) (holding that acquisition of telephone
communications, via listening on a telephone extension, by a law enforcement officer in
the ordinary course of his duties was not an “interception” for the purposes of the
eavesdropping statute).
204. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650.
205. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
206. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539a (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 37 of
the 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Legis.) (emphasis added).
207. Id. § 750.539c (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
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however, concluded that a participant of the conversation may record
that conversation without the consent of other participants, thereby
effectively limiting the state’s all-party consent statute to third-party
recording of communications.208
d.

Criminal Justice Exceptions to All-Party Consent

Even those jurisdictions that have strict all-party recording laws
make some criminal justice exceptions. For example, although
California, Illinois, and Washington are all-party consent
jurisdictions, all three states permit the recording of a conversation
with the consent of one party if certain criminal activity is involved.209
Connecticut provides comparable exceptions to its usual rules of allparty consent to record telephone calls.210 Similarly, although Oregon
requires all-party consent for the recording of in-person
communications, the state dispenses with the requirement if the
conversation involves “a felony that endangers human life.”211
Moreover, as Professor Carol Bast noted, “Private parties are
treated much differently than law enforcement officers or informants
in the states requiring all-party consent.” 212 Indeed, as Table 2
illustrates, each of the jurisdictions that typically require all-party
consent for the recording of certain types of conversations provide
some statutory exceptions to those requirements for law enforcement
officers in the course of conducting criminal investigations.

208. Sullivan v Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60–61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); see also Dickerson
v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 88–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that Michigan statute
prevents “third parties from recording covertly, while it occurs, a private conversation in
which they are not participants and then rebroadcasting that conversation”); cf. Williams
v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to allow a parent to
consent on behalf of a minor child).
209. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(“[California’s wiretapping laws] do not prohibit one party to a confidential
communication from recording the communication for the purpose of obtaining evidence
reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of
the crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the
person.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/14-3(g)–(i) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100576 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (listing a range of criminal justice exceptions to all-party consent
requirement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 3d
Spec. Sess.) (providing exception for conversations that “convey threats of extortion,
blackmail, bodily harm, or other unlawful requests or demands,” hostage-related
situations, and calls that occur “anonymously or repeatedly or at an extremely
inconvenient hour”).
210. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-570d(b)(3)–(4) (West, Westlaw through 2017 June
Spec. Sess.).
211. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(5)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
212. Bast, supra note 177, at 869.
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State

Law Enforcement Exemption

California

Cal. Penal Code § 633 permits law enforcement
to record “any communication that they could
lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective
date of [the wiretapping and eavesdropping
statutes].”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d(b)(1) permits law
enforcement officers to record private telephonic
conversations in the “lawful performance” of
their official duties.
Del. Code Ann. § 1335(b)(5) exempts police
officers from all-party consent requirement.
Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(c) permits law enforcement
officers “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication when such person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such
interception and the purpose of such interception
is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.”
Ga. Code Ann. 16-11-62(2)(D) permits law
enforcement officers and their agents to use
devices in the lawful performance of official
duties “to observe, photograph, videotape, or
record the activities of persons that occur in the
presence of such officer or his or her agent.”
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-3(g) exempts law
enforcement from the all-party consent
requirement when investigating specific criminal
offenses (including forcible felonies) so long as
prior notification was made “to the State's
Attorney of the county in which [the recording] is
to occur.”
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(2)–
(6) exempt law enforcement officers from allparty consent requirements when the officer is a
party to a conversation; when recordings are
made by an officer, informant, or cooperating
witness during the investigation of a wide range
of enumerated criminal offenses; when a

Connecticut

Delaware
Florida

Georgia

Illinois

Maryland
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recording is made during a traffic stop with
notice; and if there is reasonable cause to believe
that a law enforcement officer’s safety may be in
jeopardy during the course of a criminal
investigation.
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4)
exempts law enforcement officers from all-party
consent requirement when recording or
transmitting wire or oral communications “if the
officer is a party to such communication” or if the
officer has been granted permission by the party
being recorded or transmitted during the course
of an investigation of certain criminal offenses
designated within the statute. Additionally, Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(D)(1)(e) permits
recording performed by an undercover law
enforcement officer.
Michigan
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.539g specifically
exempts “eavesdropping or surveillance not
otherwise prohibited by law” by law enforcement
officers in performance of official duties.
Montana
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c)(i) exempts
public officials and public employees if the
recording is made in the performance of an
official duty. Additionally, Mont. Code Ann. §
45-8-213(1)(c)(iii) allows recording upon consent
of one party if the other party is given notice of
the recording.
Nevada
Upon petition by the state attorney general or
the district attorney of any county, Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 179.460 grants judges the authority
to issue orders allowing law enforcement officers
to record all types of communications relevant to
the investigation of a wide range of enumerated
criminal offenses. One-party consent may be
sanctioned after the fact if seeking a court order
is impracticable as a result of some emergency
situation pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
200.620. Additionally, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
179.463 exempts law enforcement officers from
all-party consent when recording all types of
communications relevant to hostage situations.
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And because § 200.650 requires only one-party
consent for a party to an in-person conversation
to record it, courts have held that law
enforcement may wire an informant and record
the transmitted conversation.
213

New
Hampshire

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Washington

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(II)(c)–(h) not
only allows law enforcement officers to wear
wires that transmit communications while
conducting certain types of investigations, but
also allows them to record conversations
concerning certain enumerated offenses.
As previously mentioned, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
165.540(5) allows both civilians and law
enforcement personnel to record any
conversation concerning a felony that endangers
human life. That same statutory provision also
allows law enforcement officers to record
conversations in which they are a participant
while performing official duties.
18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5704 permits,
with the prior permission of the state attorney
general or the relevant county prosecutor, law
enforcement officers to record conversations
relevant to suspected criminal activity in which
the officer is a party to the conversation or,
alternatively, at least one party to the
conversation grants consent.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.090 exempts law
enforcement officers from the all-party consent
requirements if they are a party to the
conversation and if prior approval for one-party
consent to record a conversation is received from
a judicial officer who “shall” approve the
interception upon a showing of probable cause.
Additionally, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.200
provides,
conversations regarding illegal drug
should
be
intercepted,
operations

213. See, e.g., Summers v. State, 718 P.2d 676, 680 (Nev. 1986).
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transmitted, and recorded in certain
circumstances without prior judicial
approval in order to protect the life and
safety of law enforcement personnel and to
enhance prosecution of drug offenses, and
that that interception and transmission can
be done without violating the constitutional
guarantees of privacy.
Table 2: State Criminal Justice Exceptions to All-Party
Consent as of March 2018.

e. Specific Legislation Exempting BWCs from Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping Laws
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,214
six states—California, 215 Georgia, 216 Illinois, 217 Nevada, 218 New
Hampshire,219 and Oregon220—statutorily exempted BWCs from their

214. See Body-Worn Camera Data and Eavesdropping Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGSISLATURES (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/body-worn-cameras-interactive-graphic.aspx#/ [https://perma.cc/JW5T-V7A6].
215. CAL PENAL CODE § 633.02 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“Nothing in
Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 shall prohibit any POST-certified chief of police,
assistant chief of police, or police officer of a university or college campus from using or
operating body-worn cameras.”).
216. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[I]t
shall not be unlawful . . . [f]or a law enforcement officer or his or her agent to use a device
in the lawful performance of his or her official duties to observe, photograph, videotape,
or record the activities of persons that occur in the presence of such officer or his or her
agent.”).
217. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/14-3(h)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576
of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (exempting “[r]ecordings of utterances made by a person while in the
presence of a uniformed peace officer and while an occupant of a police vehicle including,
but not limited to, (i) recordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car video
camera and (ii) recordings made in the presence of the peace officer utilizing video or
audio systems, or both, authorized by the law enforcement agency”).
218. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.425(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(excluding use of “portable recording device, as defined [in other sections authoring police
use of body-worn cameras]”).
219. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2(II)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for . . . [a]ny law enforcement officer, when
conducting investigations of or making arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to
carry on the person an electronic, mechanical or other device which intercepts oral
communications and transmits such communications by radio.”); § 570-A:2(II)(j) (“It shall
not be unlawful under this chapter for . . . [a] uniformed law enforcement officer to make
an audio recording in conjunction with a video recording of a routine stop performed in
the ordinary course of patrol duties . . . provided that the officer shall first give notification
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state wiretapping and eavesdropping laws by April 1, 2017. Since that
time, at least two more states enacted legislation exempting BWCs
from their wiretapping and eavesdropping laws, including Maryland221
and Pennsylvania.222
f.

Summary

Law enforcement officers’ use of BWCs will not run afoul of
Title III or the Fourth Amendment under most circumstances for
three important reasons. First, the one-party consent approach to
recording conversations means that a law enforcement officer’s
knowledge that an encounter is being recorded satisfies the
requirements of Title III and the overwhelming majority of its state
law counterparts.
Second, little of what transpires in public will engender a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, as is the case with closedcircuit cameras that are generally used to record events in public
areas such as commercial establishments, garages, parking lots, and
the like,223 and dashboard cameras that only record what transpires
outside, BWCs will rarely reach locations in which people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. That being said, BWCs, unlike
closed-circuit cameras or dashboard cameras, can also be used in
many places in which people reasonably expect privacy, including in
their homes. Thus, BWC use might run afoul of laws that prohibit
recording conversations where a speaker expects privacy, such as
when interviewing victims of certain crimes (especially sex crimes and

of such recording to the party to the communication unless it is not reasonable or
practicable under the circumstances.”).
220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(5)(d)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (exempting a police officer “who is in uniform and displaying a badge and who is
operating . . . [a] video camera worn upon the officer’s person that records the officer’s
interactions with members of the public while the officer is on duty”).
221. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(11)(ii) (West, Westlaw through
2017 Reg. Sess.) (“It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the
course of the officer’s regular duty to intercept an oral communication with a body-worn
digital recording device or an electronic control device capable of recording video and oral
communications.”).
222. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.) (exempting any “communication made in the presence of a law enforcement officer
on official duty who is in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as a law enforcement
officer and who is using an electronic, mechanical or other [approved] device . . . to
intercept the communication in the course of law enforcement duties”).
223. See Robert D. Bickel, Susan Brinkley & Wendy White, Seeing Past Privacy: Will
the Development and Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology
Compromise an Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy, or Will the Courts Strike a
Proper Balance?, 33 STETSON L. REV. 299, 321–23 (2003).
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domestic violence offenses), assisting people who are fully or partially
unclothed, talking with people in schools or health care facilities, or
speaking to a confidential informant.224 And, according to the Urban
Institute, forty-one states have such laws.225
Third, as previously explained, the eight states that usually
require all-party consent to record conversations have specifically
exempted BWCs from the reach of those statutes (California,
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania).226 Of the remaining all-party consent states, as Table 2
illustrates, one (Connecticut) does not require all-party consent to
record in-person conversations (only telephonic communications);227
four other all-party consent states (Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana) already had provisions in their laws that carved-out
expectations for law enforcement officers from the usual
requirements for all-party consent to record conversations.228 Thus, as
a matter of statutory law, all-party consent to record conversations on
BWCs does not appear to be problematic in any state other than
Washington.
Case law in Washington, however, has established that
conversations between people interacting with law enforcement
officers acting in their official capacities are not “private” and,
therefore, do not fall within the scope of the state’s usual all-party
consent requirement.229 Relying on that case law, the Washington
State Attorney General issued a formal opinion in 2014 specifically
stating that the Washington Privacy Act does not require consent
from a citizen to record a conversation with a law enforcement
officer.230
224. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits,
68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399–402 (2016) (discussing the tension between the need for
transparency and the protection of privacy); see also Thomas K. Bud, The Rise and Risk of
Police Body-Worn Cameras in Canada, 14 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 117, 118–19 (2016)
(questioning whether the presumed gains in police accountability attendant to BWCs are
worth the tradeoffs to privacy).
225. Police Body-Worn Camera Legislation Tracker: State-by-State Breakdown,
INST.
(Jan.
2017),
http://apps.urban.org/features/body-camera-update/
URBAN
[https://perma.cc/7BBU-FWQ4].
226. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 191, 195–96, 206–07 and accompanying text.
229. See Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 683–85 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Washington
state law); Washington v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
230. Law Enforcement—Privacy—Recording Conversations—Video & Audio
Recording of Communications Between Citizens & Law Enforcement Officers Using
Body Cameras Attached to Police Uniforms, Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 8 (2014), 2014 WL
6711950, at *1.
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The legal requirements of all-party consent statutes
notwithstanding, it may be good practice for law enforcement officers
to notify people that BWCs are recording their interactions—even if
such a notification is not required by law—because “the knowledge
that cameras are running can help defuse potentially confrontational
situations and improve behavior from all parties.” 231 As will be
explained later, however, this assumption currently lacks sufficient
empirical support to amount to anything more than speculation.
3. BWC Activation in Practice: Results from Our Policy Analysis
We conducted an analysis of 129 BWC policies of law
enforcement agencies that have been funded through the US DOJ
Body-Worn Camera Policy and Implementation Program. The
analysis includes agencies funded in FY 2015 (n=54) and FY 2016
(n=75), and all agencies had their policies approved via the policy
review process we previously outlined. 232 Our review of grantee
policies uncovered a significant amount of variation in how
departments address the activation issue, particularly regarding the
degree of discretion departments give their officers as to when they
turn on their BWC.233 We classified the degree of discretion permitted
in activation on a three-level scale: mandatory (no discretion),
discretionary, and restricted.
All of the policies in our analysis describe encounters in which
activation of the BWC is mandatory, though departments address this
issue in different ways.234 Some policies provide a list of the types of
encounters in which activation is required (e.g., pedestrian stops,
searches of vehicles or residences), while others provide a general
statement only (e.g., “Officers will activate the BWC to record all
contacts with citizens in the performance of calls for service”).235
Similarly, policies also identify circumstances in which activation is
prohibited.236 For example, many of the policies we reviewed prohibit
the recording of privileged conversations, such as those between an
231. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 14.
232. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text. For more detail on the policy
analysis, see MICHAEL D. WHITE, MICHAELA FLIPPIN & CHARLES M. KATZ, KEY
TRENDS IN BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY AND PRACTICE: A TWO-YEAR POLICY
ANALYSIS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-FUNDED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
7–8
(2017),
http://bwctta.com/sites/default/files/Files/Resources/Policy%20Analysis
%20Year%202%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ7L-EME3]
233. Id. at 8–10.
234. Id. at 9.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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attorney and client.237 Approximately sixty percent of the policies
allow officer discretion in activation if they find themselves in an
encounter where neither the mandatory nor the prohibited criteria
apply.238 Typical language in such policies states that officers may
activate their BWCs whenever they feel their use would be beneficial
to the performance of their official duties.239
In sum, none of the policies in our analysis allow full officer
discretion with activation. Rather, all policies provide certain
parameters to guide officer decision-making. This finding
demonstrates how police departments are employing administrative
policy to guide officer decision-making on BWC activation (rather
than leaving the decision solely to the officers). Moreover, most
policies allow for discretionary activation under certain
circumstances, indicating that many agencies recognize the
importance of officer discretion in circumstances that do not meet the
mandatory or prohibitory criteria for BWC activation.
B.

Policy Issue 2: Citizen Notification

Research suggests that people behave differently when they
know they are being observed. 240 Specifically, it appears that
“knowing with sufficient certainty that our behavior is being observed
or judged affects various social cognitive processes: We experience
public self-awareness, become more prone to socially acceptable
behavior, and sense a heightened need to cooperate with rules.”241
For example, people who know they are being observed using
security cameras increase “prosocial” behaviors, such as helping
someone in need. 242 Conversely, video monitoring also decreases

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Tayna L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, The Chameleon Effect: The Perception–
Behavior Link and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 893
(1999) (explaining the “chameleon effect” in which people unconsciously mimic “the
postures, mannerisms, facial expressions, and other behaviors” of the people with whom
they are interacting in a social environment); see also Ethan Bernstein, How Being Filmed
Changes Employee Behavior, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014
/09/how-being-filmed-changes-employee-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/TR2L-H53C] (“The
most significant impact of bodycams, taxicams, and the like is not reliving the past but,
rather, changing behavior in the present. We act differently when we know we’re on
camera.”).
241. Ariel et al., supra note 138, at 297 (internal citations omitted).
242. Thomas J. L. van Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk & Marieke L. Fransen, The Eye of the
Camera: Effects of Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 63–64
(2009).
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undesirable behaviors, such as employee theft,243 vandalism on school
busses,244 and the commission of certain types of crimes in public
areas.245 Collectively, these “observer effect” findings suggest that
being recorded can deter undesirable behaviors.
This very premise underlies the purported usefulness of BWCs,
insofar as they are expected to promote respectful encounters
between police and the people with whom officers interact—
“resulting in fewer citizen complaints, less use of force by officers, and
fewer assaults on officers.”246 But this premise amounts to little more
than an untested assumption with regard to how BWCs actually affect
behavior of officers and members of the public.247 At least two major
studies are currently underway which endeavor to answer those
questions.248
1. Deterrence Theory May Be Inapplicable During High-Stress
Critical Incidents
At first blush, it might appear self-evident that BWCs affect
behavior.249 Consider, for example, that Professor Saul Kassin and
243. Lamar Pierce, Daniel C. Snow & Andrew Mcafee, Cleaning House: The Impact of
Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity, 61 MGMT. SCI.
2299, 2300 (2015).
244. Barry Poyner, Video Cameras and Bus Vandalism, 11 J. SEC. ADMIN. 44, 46
(1988).
245. NANCY G. LA VIGNE, SAMANTHA S. LOWRY, JOSHUA MARKMAN & ALLISON
DWYER, EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME
CONTROL AND PREVENTION xii–xiii (2011), http://www.urban.org/research/publication
/evaluating-use-public-surveillance-cameras-crime-control-and-prevention/view/full_report
[https://perma.cc/L6N2-KD7T].
246. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10142, CAN BODY WORN
CAMERAS SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO POLICE MISCONDUCT? 1 (2012); see also
STANLEY, supra note 18, at 1–2 (arguing BWCs would decrease the amount of violent
police encounters effect while promoting police accountability); Shira A. Scheindlin &
Peter K. Manning, Will the Widespread Use of Police Body Cameras Improve Police
Accountability? AMERICAS Q., Spring 2015, at 24, 26 (hypothesizing the same); WHITE,
supra note 2, at 35–36 (noting the “civilizing effect” BWCs were expected to facilitate).
247. See Ariel et al., supra note 138, at 294 (“Similarly, while the theory underpinning
the effect of BWCs is relatively straightforward—deterrence theory juxtaposed with
observer effects—estimates of the efficacy of BWC are scarce, resembling a void largely
filled by conceptual research.” (internal citations omitted)).
248. Nell Greenfieldboyce, Scientists Hunt Hard Evidence on How Cop Cameras Affect
Behavior, NPR (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/27
/525081998/scientists-hunt-hard-evidence-on-how-cop-cameras-affect-behavior [https://perma.cc
/9WFJ-PNMK (dark archive)].
249. Although not relevant to the policy considerations attendant to citizen
notification, it should be noted that psychological research raises a question about an
untendered consequence of BWCs on police behavior, namely will the technology overdeter police in what researchers have dubbed “the transparency trap.” Ethan Bernstein,
The Transparency Trap, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2014, at 58, 58. The phenomenon occurs
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colleagues found that recording police conduct during interrogations
inhibits certain tactics designed to illicit confessions from suspects.250
That study, however, occurred in the relative calm of an experimental
field setting; it may or may not be generalizable to actual
confessions. 251 But its generalizability beyond interrogations and
confessions to any deterrent effect BWCs might have during criticalincident situations is even more questionable for a few reasons.
First, any type of “deterrence might fail if any societal condition
exists that undermines the successful transmission or reception of the
deterrence message.”252 That concern underpins the reason why many
jurisdictions require or recommend that law enforcement officers
notify the members of the public that their interactions are being
recorded by BWCs.253 But a wide range of conditions might hamper
the delivery of such reminders. For example, officers may not have
time to warn citizens that they are being recorded in emergencyresponse situations; indeed, they may not even have time to activate
their BWCs in certain critical incidents.254 Moreover, depending on
the nature of the encounter, officers and citizens alike may be so

when transparency stifles innovative behavior and decreases productivity as a function of
the observed person doing only what is expected of them and no more. See id. This
phenomenon might mean that police sacrifice “the kind of educated risk-taking and
problem solving that’s often needed to save lives.” Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics
and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 839 (2015) (quoting Bernstein, supra).
250. Saul M. Kassin, Jeff Kukucka, Victoria Z. Lawson, John DeCarlo & Margaret
Bull Kovera, Does Video Recording Alter the Behavior of Police During Interrogation? A
Mock Crime-and-Investigation Study, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 80–81 (2014).
251. See id. at 81–82.
252. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1983); see also Michael R. Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence: Some
Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 500 (1975) (“In order to be
maximally effective or successful, a system of deterrence must transmit its message to all
potential offenders.”).
253. Sutherland and Ariel explained why this may be important when they
hypothesized,
[A] verbal warning could sensitize people leading them to modify their behavior.
It could also serve to remind people of the rules that are in play—politeness being
the bare minimum—but other rules such as laws. Similarly, the verbal prompt may
jolt individuals into thinking a little more before they act, becoming more
deliberative and reflecting on future consequences. In short, there could be lots of
mechanisms that account for changes in behavior when camera and verbal warning
are used together.
Alex Sutherland & Barak Ariel, Cameras on Cops: The Jury’s Still Out, CONVERSATION
(Dec. 23, 2014), https://theconversation.com/cameras-on-cops-the-jurys-still-out-35644
[https//perma.cc/H2TA-XA8D].
254. See Soo Rin Kim, Turning on Body-Worn Cameras, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2015,
at 16, 16–18.
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upset they forget they are being recorded because acute stress impairs
working memory—the part of short-term memory responsible for
immediate conscious perceptual and linguistic processing.255
Second, like criminal deterrence generally, 256 the presumed
deterrent effect of BWCs on undesirable officer and citizen behavior
alike is premised on rational thought. But that premise may be
inapplicable not only to particular people (such as people with certain
types of mental illness)257 but also during critical incidents in which
emotion and instinct might overwhelm rationality under the stress of
the situation.258 Indeed, rational thought is inevitably impaired when
people are in fear for their lives; in such situations, the fight-or-flight
response kicks in.259
Third, as Wikström explained, “rationality and an individual’s
capability to exercise self-control come into play as factors only when
an individual deliberates over action alternatives.”260 In contrast, if
one acts out of habit, rather than deliberate choice, then deterrence
can be significantly undermined. Because people are often creatures
of habit, 261 the presumed deterrent effect of BWCs may be
255. Mathias Luethi, Beat Meier & Carmen Sandi, Stress Effects on Working Memory,
Explicit Memory, and Implicit Memory for Neutral and Emotional Stimuli in Healthy Men,
FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE, Jan. 2009, at 1, 6.
256. See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 84–104 (1974).
257. See generally ROBERT SCHUG & HENRY F. FRADELLA, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
CRIME (2015) (explaining how a variety of mental illnesses impair rational thought in
ways that contribute to criminal offending).
258. In fact, even “mild acute uncontrollable stress can cause a rapid and dramatic loss
of prefrontal cognitive abilities.” Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways that Impair
Prefrontal Cortex Structure and Function, 10 NATURE REVS. 410, 410 (2009).
259. See generally WALTER CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE BODY (1932) (originating
the term “fight-or-flight response”). This response triggers the sympathetic nervous
system to flood the body with adrenaline and cortisol as part of an instinctual reaction
designed to move us away from rational thought—including contemplation of the
consequences of our actions—and into a mode where we either flee or attack to facilitate
our own survival. See Sara F. Dudley, Paved with Good Intentions: Title IX Campus Sexual
Assault Proceedings and the Creation of Admissible Victim Statements, 46 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 117, 131 (2016); see also Eric Y. Drogin & Ryan Marin, Extreme Emotional
Disturbance (EED), Heat of Passion, and Provocation: A Jurisprudent Science Perspective,
36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 133, 140 (2008) (explaining how extreme stress can contribute to a
loss of self-control).
260. Per-Olof Wikström, Deterrence and Deterrence Experiences—Preventing Crime
Through the Threat of Punishment, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PENOLOGY
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 345, 375 (Shlomo Giora Shoham, Ori Beck & Martin Kett eds.,
2008).
261. See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119
PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 6–7 (1996) (positing that habitation actions are a function of an
automatic mode of thinking characterized by a rapid, intuitive, and heuristic response that
stands in contrast to intentional behaviors that are a function of deliberative and
contextualized thought); cf. GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS––THE INTELLIGENCE
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inapplicable to both select officers and select criminal offenders alike
if they habitually act in ways that BWCs are supposed to deter.262
2. Citizen Notification of the BWC in Practice: Results from Our
Policy Analysis
As the preceding summary of psychological research suggests, it
remains an open question as to whether citizen notification of BWCs
will actually affect the behavior of the officers wearing the cameras or
the people with whom they interact. Although the deterrent effects of
BWCs remain to be seen, a sizable minority of law enforcement
agencies have adopted policies requiring officers to notify members of
the public when they are being recorded during encounters with
police.263 Our review of policies from agencies funded through the US
DOJ BWC program indicates that twenty-two percent of policies
adopted in FY 2015 and thirteen percent adopted in FY 2016 have
notification policies requiring officers to “inform all individuals
identifiably present as soon as reasonably practical” about the
recording. 264 In contrast, roughly forty percent of the policies
reviewed (in both years) recommend, but do not require, citizen
notification. 265 The remaining policies neither mandate nor
recommend citizen notification—they simply state that notification is
not a requirement.266 Thus, these results indicate that agencies are
increasingly willing to leave the citizen notification decision in the
hands of the officer.267
This trend away from mandatory citizen notification raises
serious questions regarding the potential for BWCs to generate a
civilizing effect. Setting aside questions related to deterrence and
rational thought, a camera can only reasonably be expected to change
behavior if the citizen is aware of its presence.

OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 207–29

(2007) (exploring how habit and other cognitive shortcuts
act as mechanisms that allow us to bypass the processes of evaluating the potential
consequences of engaging in certain behaviors).
262. Cf. Scheindlin & Manning, supra note 246, at 25, 27 (debating whether the usual
responses of law enforcement officers in potentially violent situations will be deterred by
BWCs without other changes to officer training and departmental polices).
263. WHITE ET AL., supra note 232, at 10.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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Policy Issues 3 and 4: Officer and Supervisor Review of BWC
Footage

As previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies have been
quick to adopt BWCs as part of a presumed solution to the crisis in
contemporary policing. But in spite of the seemingly “world-wide
uncontrolled social experiment” concerning their use,268 it remains
unclear whether BWCs will help or hurt police legitimacy. The
answer to that question is likely quite complex. After all, the varying
responses to a number of shootings by police that were captured on
video indicate that BWC footage may complicate police-community
relations instead of improving them.269 Although the end result will
turn on a multiplicity of factors in any particular case, psychological
research suggests that post-hoc review of BWC footage may create
more problems than it solves.
1. How Will Third-Parties Interpret BWC Footage?
How will third parties (e.g., commanding officers, citizen review
board members, prosecutors, judges, and jurors) interpret BWC
footage? Video from BWCs does not necessarily speak for itself. As
Professor Howard Wasserman thoughtfully explained, video footage
from BWCs is not any more unambiguous or reliable than eyewitness
testimony.270 Indeed, there are at least three reasons why footage may
create disputes about the substance of what a BWC may have
captured on audio and video.
a.

Temporal Limitations

Obviously, BWCs cannot capture the events that occurred prior
to the start of recording or after recording ends. Similarly, BWCs
cannot capture footage when they are not turned on, regardless of
whether the failure to activate them was purposeful or
unintentional. 271 If officers are concerned with whether they
268. Ariel et al., supra note 29, at 745.
269. See Body-Worn Cameras Are Not a Panacea for Police-Community Relations,
Police Foundation President Tells Federal Task Force, POLICE FOUND.,
https://www.policefoundation.org/body-worn-cameras-are-not-a-panacea-for-police-communityrelations-police-foundation-president-tells-federal-task-force/
[https://perma.cc/5BK9S7LD] (summarizing Police Foundation president Jim Bueermann’s testimony to the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing).
270. Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 543, 551 (2017). For a review of the shortcomings of
eyewitness testimony, see generally Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2007).
271. See generally Kim, supra note 254 (detailing the issues with BWC inactivation).
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remembered to activate their BWCs, that worry may impact the
officer’s ability to form detailed memories of the situation.272 Indeed,
a number of high-profile cases in which officers claimed to have
forgotten to activate their BWCs have led to the development of
BWCs that start to record as soon as an officer draws a gun.273 But
such devices still suffer from a temporal limitation insofar as their
automatic activation does not capture potentially critical information
concerning what occurred before a weapon is drawn.
Even if BWCs were always activated (an approach few
authorities recommend in light of privacy concerns and resource
implications),274 what gets recorded may not tell the whole story since
what transpired before officers arrive at a particular scene may be
highly relevant to what occurs once they arrive. Moreover, as the next
two subsections detail, what BWCs capture may be interpreted in
dramatically different ways for a number of psychological reasons.275
b.

Field of Vision

BWC footage’s “length, clarity, distance, angle, steadiness, scope,
field, lighting, perspective, field of vision, and completeness all affect
what it means.”276 This is especially important in light of the inherent
limitations of close-range video, like that obtained from BWCs, when
compared to better perspective of events that can be discerned from a
wider field-of-vision.277 Consider, for example, an experiment The
New York Times conducted 278 in which a “wider field of vision

272. Linda A. Henkel, Point-and-Shoot Memories: The Influence of Taking Photos on
Memory for a Museum Tour, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 396, 399 (2014) (reporting a “phototaking-impairment effect” in which participants who took photos of objects remembered
fewer details about those objects than participants who only observed objects without
photographing them).
273. See Laura Diaz-Zuniga, New Bodycams Start Recording with the Draw of a Gun,
CNN (July 21, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/21/us/bodycams-activate-automatically
/index.html [https://perma.cc/H4FC-5FEM].
274. See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 12–14 (explaining
PERF’s position on when BWCs should and should not be activated); STANLEY, supra
note 18, at 2–4 (explaining the ACLU’s position on the same consideration).
275. See, e.g., Michael Martinez, Video Shows the Encounter Between Samuel DuBose,
Officer Ray Tensing, CNN (July 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/29/us/video-samdubose-ray-tensing-chronology/index.html [https://perma.cc/J88P-22QY] (illustrating the
different ways in which video footage can be interpreted in a police shooting case).
276. Wasserman, supra note 270, at 552.
277. Id.; see also Rémi Boivin, Annie Gendron, Camille Faubert & Bruno Poulin, The
Body-Worn Camera Perspective Bias, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 125, 136
(2017) (concluding that “BWCs bias distance perception” of police candidates).
278. Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby & Damien Cave, Police Body
Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
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revealed more information about the events, showing a different,
innocuous, even friendly encounter, compared with the video from
the body camera alone, which suggested a more threatening event.”279
Indeed, courts have noted this limitation of BWCs in actual cases.280
c.

Implicit Bias Affects Video Interpretation

Another consideration in third-party interpretation of BWC
footage is that the “[c]ultural, demographic, social, political, and
ideological characteristics and attitudes of the viewer affect what that
viewer sees.” 281 Put differently, the implicit biases of the person
watching video evidence will affect how the video is interpreted.282
Consider, for example, a recent study by Roseanna Sommers in which
she showed mock jurors actual police footage. 283 She found that
viewers’ prior attitudes toward the police significantly affected their
interpretations of the recorded events, resulting in considerable
polarization on a variety of dimensions.284
2. Participant Credibility in the Face of Differences Between
Recorded Footage and Memory
Will BWCs affect the credibility of officers and the people with
whom they interact because they remember the events that occurred
during critical incidents differently than the ways in which the
incident appears to have unfolded as recorded? BWC footage has
great potential to create battles concerning witness veracity for

/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html [https://perma.cc/2SZA-LDPF (dark
archive)].
279. Wasserman, supra note 270, at 552 (citing Williams et al., supra note 278); see also
Boivin et al., supra note 277, at 137 (reporting the results of an experiment suggesting that
the more one is trained to evaluate police interventions, the greater the effect of camera
perspective distortion).
280. See Emmons v. City of Escondido, 168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1275 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
(“The court notes that if a picture is worth a thousand words, a video from the body-worn
camera of a law enforcement officer during a ‘contact’ giving rise to litigation may be
worth a thousand pictures. Such is the case here. The video shows that the officers acted
professionally and respectfully in their encounter with Plaintiffs. However, at the point of
Mr. Emmons arrest, Officer Craig was so close to Mr. Emmons that the videotape does
not show the force used when Mr. Emmons was physically taken to, or placed on, the
ground. The image is not clear enough to make determinations as a matter of law.”).
281. Wasserman, supra note 270, at 553.
282. See L. Song Richardson & Philip Atiba Goff, The Psychology of Racial Violence,
in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION 17, 20
(Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2016); see also Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting
Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1314 (2016).
283. Sommers, supra note 282, at 1313–14.
284. Id. at 1321–24.
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reasons that have to do with the complex bio-psychosocial factors that
affect memory. Contrary to common misperception, memories—
unlike unaltered BWC footage—are not exact recordings of events.285
a.

Perception and Its Relationship to Memory

Perception is often viewed “in terms of our basic senses—sight,
hearing, touch, taste, and smell. But, in reality, perception is a
process—‘the total amalgam of sensory signals received and then
processed by an individual at any one time.’”286 Of course, perception
varies based on the physical environment. For example, different
lighting, “especially back lighting, reflections, and shadows,” impacts
people’s ability to see, particularly when it comes to fine details.287
Yet, because perception is an “interpretive process,” psychological
factors impact perception just as much as physical senses—even under
optimal conditions for sensory input.288 In fact, the sensory data we
perceive is not only dependent upon perceptual ability and attention,
but also upon “experience, learning, preferences, biases, and
expectations.”289
First, perception is selective.290 We do not always perceive that
which is there for us to see or hear, as any distracted driver can attest.
One of the most important factors affecting our ability to
perceive is the volume of sensory stimulation. “Perception is
highly selective because the number of signals or amount of
information impinging upon the senses is so great that the mind
can process only a small fraction of the incoming data.” This
means we focus on certain stimuli while filtering out others.
This results not only in incomplete acquisition of sensory data,

285. Fradella, supra note 270, at 5. See generally R. C. Atkinson & R. M. Shiffrin,
Human Memory: A Proposed System and its Control Processes, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 89 (Kenneth W.
Spence & Janet T. Spence eds., 1968) (overviewing the various facets of the human
memory).
286. Fradella, supra note 270, at 5 (quoting Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense
and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 181 (1990)).
287. Ralph N. Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1057, 1060 (2000).
288. Fradella, supra note 270, at 5 (quoting Robert Buckhout, Psychology and
Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 75, 76 (1976)).
289. Id. (quoting Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert
Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 724–27 (1985)).
290. Id.; see also DANIEL REISBERG, THE SCIENCE OF PERCEPTION AND MEMORY
32–35 (2014).
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but also in differential processing and interpretation of
events.291
Put differently, a person’s perception may be incomplete if he or she
experiences “sensory overload”—the situation in which people are
“overwhelmed with too much information in too short a period of
time.” 292 Accordingly, how these gaps in perception are filled is
another important consideration with regard to perception. Indeed,
“[w]hen these gaps are filled, the details often fit logically, but
inaccurately. The type of stimuli involved also affects perception. In
particular, people are poor perceivers of duration (we tend to overestimate how long something takes), time (it ‘flies by’ or ‘drags on’),
speed, distance, height, and weight.” 293 Thus, because humans
unconsciously process sensory information, they are unaware of how
perception may vary from person to person. Such variation, in turn,
can affect people’s memories of critical incidents—a situation that is
fraught with the possibility of people being interpreted as untruthful
if their memories do not align with BWC footage.
b.

The Three Phases of Memory

Just as perceptual processes occur unconsciously, so do the
processes associated with memory. 294 Specifically, memory “is
dependent upon three critical stages—acquisition/encoding, retention,
and recall/retrieval,” all of which “are affected by a number of
physical and psychological factors that can taint the accuracy of a
memory.”295
First is the acquisition (or encoding) stage. During this stage,
“sensory data, as perceived by the individual, are encoded in the
appropriate areas of the cerebral cortex.” 296 Thus, because
“perception itself is a process dependent on a number of
individualized factors, this stage in the process of developing
memories is affected by those same factors,” including sensory
overload.297 Indeed, in this stage, sensory overload can be so extreme
that it leads to “confabulation”—“the creation or substitution of false
291. Fradella, supra note 270, at 5–6 (quoting Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense
and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 181 (1990)).
292. Id. at 6 (quoting Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The
Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 726 (1985)).
293. Id. (citing Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness
Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 181 (1990)).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 7 (citing Haber & Haber, supra note 287).
297. Id.
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memories through later suggestion.” 298 Additionally, “[a] person's
expectations influence the way in which details about an event are
encoded. An observer tends to seek out some information and avoid
other information, an effect called the confirmation bias. What gets
encoded is, therefore, partially dependent on that for which the
observer was looking.”299
Next is the retention (or storage) phase, during which “the brain
stores the memory until it is called upon for retrieval.”300 The amount
of data being encoded and retained therefore affects this phase: “The
greater the amount of data presented, especially in shorter periods of
time, the less that will be retained.” 301 Exposure to subsequent
information is also relevant to retention and storage of memory.302 In
what psychology refers to as the “post-event misinformation effect,”
exposure to post-event misinformation can lead people to accept that
misinformation “as if it were an accurate account.”303
The final phase is the retrieval phase, during which “the brain
searches for the pertinent information, retrieves it, and communicates
it.”304 As the name of this phase implies, retrieval occurs whenever
police or members of the public describe what they recall having
occurred during an encounter, including when testifying in court.305
Time is one of the most salient factors affecting the ability to recall
information from memory: “As a rule, the longer the time period
between acquisition, retention, and retrieval, the more difficulty we
have retrieving the memory.” 306 Additionally, “unconscious
transference”––a process in which “different memory images may

298. Id. (quoting Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert
Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 726 (1985)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 8.
303. Id. See generally Malwina Szpitalak, Mateusz Polak, Romuald Polczyk & Karolina
Dukała, The Influence of Social, Para-Social, and Nonsocial Misleading Post-Event
Sources on Memory Performance: Social Contagion and the Misinformation Effect, 46
EURO. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 185 (2016) (measuring the effect of socially-presented
information on the post-event misinformation effect).
304. Fradella, supra note 270, at 8 (quoting Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable
Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L.
REV. 721, 725 (1985)).
305. Id.
306. Id.; see also CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 220 (2015).
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become combined or confused with one another”307—also affects the
retrieval of memories.
Because each of the three phases of memory can be affected by
the aforementioned factors, any given person’s memory of what
transpired during a particular incident may not align with what is
captured by BWCs. This disconnect demonstrates additional
psychological reasons why BWC footage might be misinterpreted by
judges and jurors as evidence that someone is being dishonest.
c.

Event Factors that Affect Memory

Memories of an event are also affected by a number of factors
related to the event itself. Psychological research has identified a
number of critical event factors that affect memory formation,
including time,308 the effect of injuries,309 whether participants have
alcohol or drugs in their system, 310 the presence or absence of
violence,311 the role of the participant,312 and how much stress the
event caused the participant to experience.313 Traumatic events, in
307. Fradella, supra note 270, at 8 (citing John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman &
Christian A. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and
Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV. 12, 15 (1999)).
308. Id. at 9–10 (“[T]he longer one has to examine something, the better the memory
formation will be and the more accurate recall will be. Conversely, the less time someone
has to witness an event, the less complete—and less accurate—both perception and
memory will be . . . . Given the limitations of human perception, when things happen very
quickly, memory can be negatively affected. This is true even when someone has a
reasonable period of time to observe an event insofar as attention is focused on processing
a fast-moving series of events, rather than on a particular aspect of the occurrence.”
(footnotes omitted)).
309. REISBERG, supra note 290, at 54–55 (noting how loss of blood can disrupt
memory and perception while the event is occurring, as well as retroactively).
310. Id. at 55–59 (explaining how drugs and alcohol can disrupt both the formation of
new memories and the recall of older memories).
311. For example, if a weapon is present during a critical incident, participant attention
is usually drawn to the weapon at the expense of event details. Id. at 47. For a review of
the “weapon focus” effect, see generally Kerri L. Pickel, The Influence of Context on the
“Weapon Focus” Effect, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299 (1999).
312. Indeed, most people do not remember events accurately; rather, memories are
“very personal and self-serving” insofar as they help people make sense of themselves and
their own experiences in relation to the rest of the world—a phenomenon described as the
“inevitable wrong focus of autobiographical memory.” Haber & Haber, supra note 287, at
1066–68.
313. REISBERG, supra note 290, at 60; see also Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H.
Bornstein, Steven D. Penrod & E. Kiernan McGorty, A Meta-Analytic Review of the
Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004)
(“[W]e have adduced considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of stress
negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as accuracy of recall of
crime-related details.”); Louis S. Katz & Jeremiah F. Reid, Expert Testimony on the
Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 177, 184–86 (1977) (“When an
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particular, can lead to “dramatic alterations in memory
functioning.” 314 Although the particular mechanisms of memory
impairment are not well understood, many psychologists and
neuroscientists nonetheless share the view that trauma (or associated
posttraumatic symptoms) can significantly interfere with normal
memory functioning through “memory fragmentation or
disorganization[,] . . . the dissociation of trauma memories from other
autobiographical memories[,] . . . increased susceptibility to memory
distortion[,] or impaired retrieval of memories of specific
autobiographical events.”315
Collectively, the event factors that affect memory encoding,
retention, and retrieval suggest that the way in which police officers
and members of the public remember particular critical incidents may
differ significantly from what is captured on video by BWCs, even
though participants may sincerely believe what they recall to be
completely accurate. Because such differences between people’s
recollections and BWC footage might be interpreted as grounds to
doubt witnesses’ veracity, precautions may need to be taken to ensure
that judges and jurors understand the psychological phenomena that
affect perception and memory. Because jury instructions have often
proven insufficient in helping triers-of-fact understand the
complexities of perception and memory in the realm of eyewitness
(mis)identifications,316 expert testimony may be needed to help jurors
understand why BWC footage may not align with what critical
incident participants recall.

eyewitness is under . . . physical and emotional stress during the commission of the crime,
the reliability of his testimony is reduced”); Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of
Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27
INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 274 (2004) (“These data provide robust evidence that
eyewitness memory for persons encountered during events that are personally relevant,
highly stressful, and realistic in nature may be subject to substantial error.”).
314. Sally A. Moore & Lori A. Zoellner, Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory and
Traumatic Events: An Evaluative Review, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 419, 419 (2007); see also
Sharon Dekel & George A. Bonanno, Changes in Trauma Memory and Patterns of
Posttraumatic Stress, 5 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA 26, 31–32 (2013) (indicating that varying levels
of posttraumatic stress affect memory over time). For a more comprehensive overview of
the psychological and legal issues related to trauma’s impact on memory, see generally
PAUL S. APPELBAUM, LISA A. UYEHARA & MARK R. ELIN, TRAUMA AND MEMORY:
CLINICAL AND LEGAL CONTROVERSIES (1997) and PETER A. LEVINE, TRAUMA AND
MEMORY: BRAIN AND BODY IN A SEARCH FOR THE LIVING PAST (2015).
315. Moore & Zoellner, supra note 314, at 419 (citations omitted).
316. Fradella, supra note 270, at 2–4, 21–23.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018)

1632

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

3. Policy Implications
The foregoing questions about the interpretation of BWC
footage and the potential credibility concerns that such a review may
unmask when footage is compared to an officer’s notes or recollection
about a critical incident give rise to another important policy
question: should officers be permitted to review footage from BWCs
prior to writing an official police report or giving a statement about a
critical incident? The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has
argued that the answer is no, because allowing officers such access
“enables lying,” “undermines the legitimacy of investigations,”
“enables cross-contamination of evidence,” and generally “impedes
the search for truth.”317
Intentional misrepresentations aside, the psychological issues
outlined throughout this Section support the ACLU’s position.
Specifically, if officers are allowed to review video footage prior to
writing a report or giving a statement for an investigation, all the
aforementioned issues concerning field of vision limitations and
implicit bias are likely to shape what officers write in their reports or
say in their statements, which can result in distortions being presented
as sincerely-believed fact. These distortions may be particularly
salient in critical incidents involving the use of potentially lethal force.
Consider, for example, that criminologists David Klinger and Rod
Brunson examined the detailed accounts of eighty police officers
involved in “113 incidents in which they shot citizens.”318 Their study
found that officers experience multiple types of perceptual
distortions—including visual, auditory, and temporal—that may cause
officers to behave in a manner inconsistent with the “objective reality
of what is occurring at the time they decide to pull the trigger,” and
instead based on “an altered conception of reality.”319
On the other hand, if officers are not permitted to review footage
before writing a report, any conflicts that arise between an officer’s
memory—including those that may be based upon perceptual
distortions experienced during a potentially lethal use of force
incident—and BWC footage “can cause an officer to lose credibility
317. Jay Stanley & Peter Birbring, Should Officers Be Permitted to View Body Camera
Footage Before Writing Their Reports?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE
(Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/should-officers-be-permitted-viewbody-camera-footage-writing-their-reports [https://perma.cc/Z63K-U62X].
318. David A. Klinger & Rod K. Brunson, Police Officers’ Perceptual Distortions
During Lethal Force Situations: Informing the Reasonableness Standard, 8 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 117, 117 (2009).
319. Id. at 118, 127.
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or be accused of lying if, for example, an officer’s memory is not
accurate about some of the critical details of an encounter.”320 This
possibility led the prominent Police Executive Research Forum
(“PERF”) to recommend that officers involved in critical incidents
recorded on BWCs be permitted to view the footage before giving an
official statement about the incident.321 The ACLU counters that
allowing such access constitutes poor investigative practice: “Any
detective would be the first to say that it’s hardly a solid investigative
practice to let the subject of an investigation view the video evidence
you have over and over before you even ask them what happened.”322
4. Officer Review of BWC Footage in Practice: Results from Our
Policy Analysis
Our review of policies for federally funded agencies indicates
that upwards of ninety-eight percent of departments routinely allow
officers to review BWC footage for report writing purposes.323 In fact,
many departments encourage their officers to “review BWC media
prior to completing any investigative reports.” 324 In contrast, this
uniformity among departments is lacking in the context of officer
review of BWC footage following a use of force incident or after a
complaint is filed against an officer. Between one quarter and one
third of agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively, permit
officers “unrestricted access to their BWC footage during an
administrative investigation.”325 A more common policy, however, is
to require officers to satisfy certain stipulations—such as a union
representative (and/or a commanding officer) being present––before
allowing them to access the footage. 326 This conditional review
approach was adopted by sixty-six percent of agencies in FY 2015 and
fifty-six percent in FY 2016.327
Review following critical incidents is generally subject to
different standards. Fewer than five percent and nine percent of
agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively, explicitly prohibit
an officer from reviewing his or her BWC footage until after a
320. Michael Kashiktchian, Should Police View Body Worn Cameras Before Writing a
Report?, IN PUB. SAFETY (Feb. 18, 2016), http://inpublicsafety.com/2016/02/should-policeview-body-worn-cameras-before-writing-a-report/ [https://perma.cc/UPY8-8W6A].
321. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 45.
322. Stanley & Birbring, supra note 317.
323. WHITE ET AL., supra note 232, at 11.
324. Id. (emphasis added).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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statement is given.328 That is to say, the overwhelming majority of
agencies allow their officers to review BWC footage of a critical
incident prior to giving a statement.
5. Supervisory Review of BWC Footage in Practice: Results from
Our Policy Analysis
What should happen with the footage captured by BWCs? This
complex question raises a number of distinct concerns, many of which
have already been ably delineated elsewhere. For example, scholars,
civil rights organizations, and policy think tanks have already weighed
in on the need for data retention and public disclosure policies that
attempt to strike a balance between transparency and accountability
on the one hand and the preservation of privacy and the risk of
function creep on the other.329 We focus on a different question—
namely supervisory review of BWC use.
There have been numerous high-profile cases in which officers
failed to activate their BWCs under circumstances when they were
required to do so. Consider the recent example of Australian Justine
Damond, who was fatally shot in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on July 15,
2017:
[E]ven though officials . . . gave a brief account of the
shooting—saying that officers were startled by a loud noise
right before Damond approached their car—her final moments
remain shrouded in mystery, in part because the two officers
who encountered Damond did not turn on their body cameras
as they arrived at the scene, preventing any video from
capturing what happened.330
Since 2014, there have been more than a dozen similarly tragic
cases in which law enforcement officers did not activate their BWCs
even though departmental policies required their use under the

328. Id.
329. See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 18, at 2; see also POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH
FORUM, supra note 128, at 15–19; WHITE, supra note 2, at 32–34; Fanny Coudert, Denis
Butin & Daniel Le Métayer, Body-Worn Cameras for Police Accountability: Opportunities
and Risks, 31 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 749, 760–62 (2015); Meyer, supra note 142
(predicting a series of problems with BWC use, including those concerning data retention
and access to footage).
330. Mark Berman, What the Minneapolis Police Shooting Tells Us About the Limits of
Body Cameras, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/07/19/what-the-minneapolis-police-shooting-tells-us-about-the-limits-ofbody-cameras/?utm_term=.27892c3db477 [https://perma.cc/PZS2-HGHG (dark archive)].
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relevant circumstances.331 What should happen to officers under such
circumstances? Certainly, prosecutors will review such cases and
make a determination as to whether officers violated any criminal
laws.332 But what should command-level personnel do to address the
situations when officers fail to activate the BWCs—especially in light
of research demonstrating low levels of activation compliance, 333
perhaps as a function of significant numbers of officers not viewing
BWCs as a legitimate tool for police accountability?334
Our review of BWC policies for federally funded agencies
identified three common methods of supervisor review.335 First, nearly
all agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016 (ninety-four percent and
ninety-nine percent, respectively) “allow first-line supervisors to
access and review the BWC footage of their officers as part of
administrative investigations, such as in response to a citizen
complaint or use of force.”336 Second, supervisors were allowed to
randomly or periodically review BWC footage “to insure compliance
with BWC policy and procedures” in fifty percent and ninety-three
percent of agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively.337
Third, nearly two-thirds of 2015-funded agencies and ninety-three

331. Scott Forsyth, Should Officers Be Penalized for Not Using Body Cameras?,
LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1436058 [https://perma.cc
/Y65J-ANUS].
332. It is exceedingly rare for law enforcement officers to be criminally charged, much
less convicted, when an officer-involved shooting occurs. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert,
Prosecuting Baltimore Police Officers, 16 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER, & CLASS
185, 185 (2016); see also Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted
of Murder Last Year for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_us_5695968ce4b086bc1cd5d0da
[https://perma.cc/T54U-WV5h] (reporting that no officers were convicted of murder or
manslaughter in 2014 or 2015 for fatal shootings of civilians in the line of duty); Kimberly
Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted/
[https://perma.cc/ML4T-PMNH] (noting how even the “most extreme instances” of officer
killings have not led to serious penalties for officers); Clif Leblanc, SC Officers Exonerated
in More than 200 Shootings, STATE (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.thestate.com/news/local
/crime/article15654974.html [https://perma.cc/9JG6-9CKG] (reporting that no South
Carolina officers accused of illegally firing their weapons at suspects over a five-year
period had been convicted of any crime).
333. Hedberg et al., supra note 48, at 644–45.
334. See Jacob T. N. Young & Justin T. Ready, Diffusion of Ideas and Technology the
Role of Networks in Influencing the Endorsement and Use of on-Officer Video Cameras, 31
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 243, 244–46 (2015); see also Jennings et al., supra note 19, at 551
(noting that only 29.7% of surveyed officers believed BWCs would “increase their
likelihood of behaving ‘by-the-book’”).
335. WHITE ET AL., supra note 232, at 12.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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percent of 2016-funded agencies permit supervisors to review BWC
footage for “general performance” purposes––i.e., for reasons
unrelated to the use of the BWC.338
CONCLUSION: APPLYING A DISCRETION-CONTROL FRAMEWORK TO
BWC USE
Since the summer of 2014, a series of police killings of citizens
have generated public protest, civil disorder, and widespread demand
for police reform.339 In response, BWCs have emerged as a potential
solution to the police-community relations crisis.340 Though cameras
have diffused rapidly, the current body of research, detailed
throughout this Article, suggests that implementation of a BWC
program comes with a high degree of difficulty, and the consequences
of implementation failure are significant.
This Article informs the continued diffusion of police BWCs
through a detailed examination of the research and resources
available for program planning, implementation, and management.
The authors first addressed the mixed body of research on BWCs and
the US DOJ best-practice resources for program planning and
implementation341 and for policy development.342 With this as context,
the authors then critically examined four controversial policy
positions related to BWC use: the activation decision, citizen
notification, officer authority to review, and supervisor authority to
review. For each, we described a complex set of issues that serve as a
backdrop for the BWC policy position. We then examined prevailing
policy trends based on a review of 129 BWC policies from agencies
that have been funded by the US DOJ.
The results of our policy analysis for these four positions were
mixed. In some cases, the directionality of agency policy positions is
consistent with our review of the research on the complex issues
underlying the policy position. For example, agency positions on the
activation decision appear to be in line with jurisprudence on citizens’
expectation of privacy and requirements for consent to record.343 In at
least one case, however, the prevailing policy trend is not supported
by the research examining the underlying issues. More specifically,
policies examined here commonly allow for officer review of BWC
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36; supra Part II.
See Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, supra note 40; supra Part III.
See supra Section IV.A.3.
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footage of a critical incident before requiring that officer to give a
formal statement about the event. 344 This policy position is
inconsistent with the body of evidence on third-party interpretation of
video, implicit bias, perception, and memory.345 The review of these
controversial policy positions highlights the critical importance of
adhering to the US DOJ guidance on planning and implementation,
which addresses all of the issues at hand, as well as a thoughtful,
deliberate, and collaborative policy development process.
Formal BWC policy notwithstanding, law enforcement agencies
will need to focus their attention on officer compliance with laws and
policies concerning BWC use. Officers’ failure to follow BWC
policy—whether it be for activation, citizen notification, or
officer/supervisor review—will undermine the goals of the BWC
program and may exacerbate problems between police and citizens.
The authors view officer use of BWCs as an exercise in police
discretion. Through such a lens, BWC use can and should be
regulated using the tools that have proven effective to regulating the
exercise of other forms of police discretion.
Among the wide range of conclusions drawn from numerous
studies conducted on how to impact officers’ situational decisionmaking during officer-citizen encounters,346 one empirically evident
fact is that combating police misconduct is complex and goes far
beyond quick fixes (e.g., increased training) or removing a few
“rotten apples” that consistently make poor decisions.347 Additionally,
various aspects of police culture can further inhibit attempts to stem
police misconduct at the department level, considering that
“[r]esearch has consistently demonstrated the powerful nature of the
informal police culture, particularly with regard to how it can shape
officer behavior in the field and how difficult it is to change.”348
However, the larger body of research on police discretion offers
numerous lessons that can guide effective BWC policy and practice.
Police departments should consider adopting changes reflective of the
conventional wisdom from nearly five decades of research on police

344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra Section IV.C.4.
See supra Section IV.C.1.
WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 117–18.
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 184–89 (1993).
348. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 118 (citing SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note
347, at 90–93).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018)

1638

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

discretion. This body of research, which has been reviewed
elsewhere,349 centers on:
 Careful selection of personnel (screening out those are illsuited for the profession, and screening in those with desired
qualities or characteristics);
 Effective training that is realistic and career-long;
 Administrative policies that are clear, detailed, and enforced;
 Appropriate supervision and accountability.
Law enforcement agencies that ground their BWC programs in the
lessons from this literature are more likely to both experience positive
outcomes and avoid the pitfalls described in this Article. They will
also be more likely achieve the goals that prompted their initial
decision to implement a BWC program.

349. Id. at 117–145.

